Although the 2013 German elections were viewed as having wider importance for the rest of Europe, the issue of Europe itself played only a minor role in the election campaign. Sonia Alonso outlines results from an analysis of German party manifestos to assess the extent to which parties have emphasised European issues in elections since 1949. She notes that there is a downward trend in terms of the inclusion of European issues in manifestos, and that where European issues are mentioned they are increasingly likely to reflect negative attitudes toward the EU

Alonso, Sonia

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07/01/2014German party manifestos are increasingly likely todownplay European issues and reflect negative attitudestoward the EUblogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2014/01/07/german-party-manifestos-are-increasingly-likely-to-downplay-european-issues-and-reflect-negative-attitudes-toward-the-eu/Although the 2013 German elections were viewed as having wider importance for the rest of Europe, theissue of Europe itself played only a minor role in the election campaign. Sonia Alonso outlinesresults from an analysis of German party manifestos to assess the extent to which parties haveemphasised European issues in elections since 1949. She notes that there is a downward trend interms of the inclusion of European issues in manifestos, and that where European issues arementioned they are increasingly likely to reflect negative attitudes toward the EU.The coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD has been recently approved by SPDmembers in an internal party referendum, with European citizens playing the role of expectantwitnesses. Despite the wish of many Germans to the contrary, it matters a great deal for the future of Europe thetype of government that is finally formed in Germany. This is why the 2013 German election was so closely followedin other EU states.Now that we know how the election story ends (and the government’s story begins), it would be a timely exercise toanalyse German parties’ positions on Europe, as reflected in their electoral manifestos. These political texts containthe electoral promises made by German parties during the campaign. How much space did German partiesdedicate to promises related to EU matters? What were their exact positions on Europe? How close were the SPDand the CDU/CSU on the subject of Europe?It was a widespread view at the end of the German electoral campaign that Europe had received little attention. Thismay well be true of candidates’ speeches and mass media coverage (until now we have not seen data on this) butthe picture would be incomplete without looking at party manifestos. Figure 1 presents data from the ManifestoProject showing the average percentage of sentences dedicated to European issues by German parties since thefirst post-war elections in 1949.Figure 1: Mean values for percentage of sentences concerning European issues in German partymanifestos1/5Source: Manifesto ProjectThere was a peak of attention to European issues in 1998, when party manifestos dedicated on average 8 per centof sentences to it. Since then, attention has progressively decreased: in 2002 it declined to an average of 7.5 percent; while in 2005, it fell to 5 per cent. In 2009, the year after the financial crisis broke out and when EU institutionswere taking decisions that would have an enormous and (with hindsight) negative impact on the everyday lives ofEuropean citizens, attention continued its downward trend to an average of just 3.4 per cent.Last year saw a reverse of this downward tendency, not because mainstream German parties have suddenlyrealised that European issues should be back on the agenda, but because a new party focused on Germany’s role inEurope, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), has pushed the average upwards. In sum, since the Treaty of Amsterdam(1997), German parties have dedicated increasingly less space to discussing European issues in their electoralmanifestos, despite the fact that two more treaties have emerged during this period (the Treaty of Nice in 2001 andthe Treaty of Lisbon in 2007) and despite the fact that the very existence of the euro has been at stake during thedebt crisis of 2010-2011. It is precisely this gap left by German mainstream parties that has been filled in by theemergence of the AfD.Figure 1 shows other interesting data, too. Sentences have been disaggregated into positive and negativereferences to Europe so that it is possible to look at them separately. Not only have German parties given lessrelevance to European issues in the last 15 years; they have also started to talk in negative terms about Europe.Since 1998, the percentage of negative sentences about Europe in German manifestos has increased, with the year2013 constituting the highest point so far.This is again partly due to the influence of AfD on the calculation of the average. However, the increase in negativesentences had started before AfD was established. In fact, negative sentences, even if in very low numbers, beganto appear after 1998, when a Red-Green government came to power. Until then, all sentences addressing Europeanissues had always been positively framed (with only one exception in 1961).This fits well with what we know about the German debate on European integration. Most politicians andintellectuals have historically been favourably disposed towards European integration, just as the data in Figure 12/5shows. As Müller has put it, “Euroscepticism as a principled suspicion of integration (and as a set of nationalistfeelings) remains almost a political taboo [in Germany]”. The Manifesto Project’s data demonstrate that this may nolonger apply. A long-held taboo is being broken before our eyes.Figure 2 presents the evolution of EU positions as reflected in the manifestos of the three main German parties,SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP. Positions are calculated by subtracting negative statements from positive ones. If theposition score is negative, it means that negative statements are more numerous than positive ones in a givenmanifesto. The white line shows the all-parties average, including the Greens and other minor parties such as thePirates and AfD.Figure 2: EU positions of the three main German parties since 1949Source: Manifesto ProjectLet us look first at the aggregate white line, the one that measures the all-parties average. In 2013, for the first time,the aggregate EU position of the German party system was negative. Again, this is mainly due to the influence ofAfD, but there is more to it than just that. Favourable European positions started to turn less pro-European after1998, becoming increasingly less pro-European with each election.The CDU/CSU was at its most pro-European in 1987, just after the Single European Act of 1986. Between 1990 and1998 the CDU/CSU manifestos were still highly pro-European, with the position moving between 5 per cent and 6per cent. This is when the Maastricht Treaty was approved (1992) and the EU took a characteristically neo-liberalshape. The pro-Europeanism of both the FDP and the SPD grew during these years. The FDP’s pro-Europeanposition was 3 per cent in 1990 and it grew to 10 per cent in 1998, after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.Similarly, the SPD’s pro-European stance grew from 2 per cent to 6 per cent during these years. We find it difficult toexplain why the SPD became more pro-European just at a time when the EU was becoming precisely what theGerman left always feared, i.e. the exact opposite of the democratic socialist Europe they had hoped for.In any case, after 1998 all three main parties turned less pro-European, the FDP consistently so, and the SPD andCDU/CSU with a small pro-European movement in 2009 that has returned to its downward path in 2013. TheGerman manifestos at the 2013 election have positioned themselves at historically low points. The SPD’s 20133/5position has been lower only at four previous elections (1949, 1957, 1961 and 1990); the CDU/CSU’s 2013 positionhas been lower only twice (in 1949 and in 2005); the FDP has returned to the positions it kept during the 1950s and1960s.As a final point, we can illustrate a snapshot of the 2013 elections. Figure 3 shows the position of German partiesalong the left-right and pro/anti-EU scales. It comes as no surprise that AfD is strongly anti-European (although itcan hardly be characterised as an extreme-right party). Among the rest of the German parties, the FDP – on thefurthest right position – and Die Linke – on the furthest left position – are the less pro-European, probably for verydifferent reasons.The winner of the election (CDU/CSU) is located in between the FDP and the SPD along the pro/anti-EU scale, butis twice as close to the FDP along the left-right scale as to the SPD. Therefore, the two coalition partners are closeron European issues than they are on their respective left-right positions. How this will reflect in actual policy is yet tobe seen. If we have to guess from previous grand-coalition experiences, the new German government will probablylean towards the right of the left-right dimension.Figure 3: Positions of German parties on a left/right and pro-EU/anti-EU scaleNote: A negative value in the vertical axis indicates that a party was more left-wing, while apositive number indicates that their platform was more to the right of the political spectrum.A negative value in the horizontal axis indicates that a party had a negative platform towardthe EU, while a positive value shows the opposite.Source: Manifesto ProjectTo sum up, the data based on the content of German parties’ manifestos seems to support the claim that Germanydoes not wish to be the European hegemon and, if it is, it is despite the wishes of its political elite and not because ofthem. Rather, it seems as if German parties have been shying away from the European project for the last 15 years,just at a time when Europe needs them more. This is why all the self-congratulating reactions about the newGerman government and its more pro-European stance seem to be utterly premature.4/5Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1db9jpu _________________________________About the authorSonia Alonso – Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)Sonia Alonso is a Research Fellow at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).5/5

German party manifestos are increasingly likely to downplay European issues and reflect negative attitudes toward the EU

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