Sweden is one of only a handful of EU countries which are not members of NATO. Jan Joel Andersson provides an overview of Swedish defence policy and assesses the potential for Sweden to use the EU as an alternative to NATO membership. He argues that the myth of the country’s policy of ‘armed neutrality’ during the Cold War is still a key obstacle to gaining public support for joining NATO. However in practice Sweden has effectively used informal bilateral co-operation with the US and other European states to ensure its security

Andersson, Jan Joel

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Swedish Navy officer during exercise (Credit: Michael Sandberg, CC BY 2.0)20/05/2013Sweden has effectively used bilateral co-operation with theUS and other European states as an alternative to NATOmembership.blogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2013/05/20/sweden-nato-eu-alternative-us-defence-policy/Sweden is one of only a handful of EU countries which are not members of NATO. Jan Joel Anderssonprovides an overview of Swedish defence policy and assesses the potential for Sweden to use theEU as an alternative to NATO membership. He argues that the myth of the country’s policy of‘armed neutrality’ during the Cold War is still a key obstacle to gaining public support for joiningNATO. However in practice Sweden has effectively used informal bilateral co-operation with the USand other European states to ensure its security.Defence policy is currently the object of a heated public debate in Sweden. In most of Europe today,defence policy is not a topic of much concern, let alone national debate. So, why in Sweden – andwhy now?This unusual debate began in late December of last year when the Chief of Swedish Defence, General SverkerGöransson, stated in a widely-circulated interview that if Sweden were to be attacked, it would only be able todefend itself for one week before requiring foreign assistance. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussenlater added that although Sweden is NATO’s most active and most capable partner, it could not count on assistancein the event of an attack, since the Alliance Article 5 security guarantee only extends to members of NATO, anorganisation that Sweden refuses to join. Sweden’s Defence Minister Karin Enström stated in a later interview,however, that Sweden could rely on the EU for assistance since the Lisbon Treaty provides a solidarity clause,article 42.7, obligating EU member states to assist fellow EU members in case of catastrophic events or attacks.The debate escalated when, on 22 April, the Swedishmorning daily Svenska Dagbladet reported that Russiannuclear-capable bomber aircraft had launched a nightmock attack against assumed targets in Stockholm andSouthern Sweden several weeks earlier during theEaster weekend. Not only was this information keptsecret by the Swedish military, but of even greaterconcern was the fact that no Swedish fighter jets wereavailable to respond that night due to overtimerestrictions on pilots and lack of funding. NATO, incontrast, scrambled its stand-by air policing unit inLithuania and trailed the Russian bombers over theBaltic Sea as they returned to base.News of the Russian mock attack and lacklusterSwedish response led to outrage among the Swedishpublic and commentators, and bewilderment amonginternational defence analysts. In response, the Swedish military and government played down the event, statingthat Russian aircraft never actually entered the country’s air space. Indeed, Foreign Minister Carl Bildt commentedthat “We don’t react to everything, we’re not up in the air for everything and we shouldn’t be”. He later added thatthere was no factual basis to the claim that the Russian aircraft were actually conducting a mock attack on Sweden.Swedish Defence Policy and NATO1/3This series of events has left many wondering, both in Sweden and abroad, what Sweden’s defence policy actuallyconsists of. What is the state of Sweden’s defence? Does Sweden really believe the EU is a military alliance? Whydoes Sweden refuse to join NATO? These are all good questions, some of which are echoed in other Europeancountries as well.For those who have not closely studied Swedish defence policy over the past two decades, here is a brief history.During the Cold War, Sweden pursued a combination of a relatively strong territorial defence and an activist foreignpolicy of non-alignment aimed at reducing tensions between the Superpowers. This official policy of “armedneutrality” was complemented by secret bilateral cooperation with the United States and select NATO countries thatwould guarantee Western support in case of a war with the Soviet Union. A few years after the end of the Cold War,Sweden joined the EU, declared that there were no regional military threats to the country, took a strategic time out,and rapidly dismantled its territorial defence organisation to focus exclusively on international operations led byNATO and the EU.The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 rattled people in many countries, including Sweden. With no territorialdefence to speak of, but still determined to stay outside NATO, the Swedish government unilaterally issued asolidarity declaration in 2009 in regard to its Nordic neighbors and other EU members. This declaration spells outthat Sweden will support these countries in case of disaster or armed attack and that Sweden in turn expects similarsupport if affected by disaster or attack. With limited military resources and with conscription officially abolished in2010, this unilateral Swedish solidarity declaration was received with skepticism if not down-right ridicule by fellowNordic and Baltic countries that quite frankly didn’t know what to make of it.However, while Swedish defence policy has been the object of criticism and some ridicule at home and around theBaltic Sea, it has been lauded by military experts and government officials in Washington and Brussels as a leadingexample of the effective transformation of national defence and a model of military professionalism. In fact, since theend of the Cold War, the Swedish armed forces have been transformed from a massive, but rather poorly-trainedand poorly-equipped conscript-based territorial defence force to a small, professional and technologically-advancedmilitary focused on expeditionary operations in coalition with others.Indeed, over the past 15 years, the Swedish military has gained increasing international respect for its ability todeploy well-equipped, well trained, technologically advanced and mature soldiers in complete units that caneffectively integrate with US, NATO and European forces in operations from Central Asia to Central Africa. TheSwedish Air Force is rated among the very best in the world, and its contribution to the Libya operation, as well asits decision to invest in heavy airlift and modern helicopters, are much appreciated. The Swedish Navy has in turndemonstrated that it can participate in and lead international flotillas in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, andhas proven its unrivalled submarine capability by successfully attacking and “sinking” U.S. aircraft carriersundetected in extended war games in the Pacific Ocean.One explanation for this apparent disconnect between local perceptions and those in Washington and Brussels, isthat Sweden’s security policy was traditionally composed of two equal parts: an inward-looking defence policyfocused on defending the country against Soviet invasion, and an outward-looking foreign policy aimed at buildingrelationships with the US and other powers. With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the threat ofinvasion, I argue, defence policy became completely subordinate to foreign policy. When foreign policy influence isat stake, participating in international operations or exercises is far more important than patrolling the skies overSweden, despite the government’s repeated promise to ensure the sovereignty of the whole country, at all times. Infact, the reason that no Swedish fighters were on stand-by that Easter weekend was because crews and planes hadalready been stretched to their (overtime) limit following Swedish commitments to participate in and prepare foradvanced combat training exercises with US and NATO air forces.This Swedish form of post-Cold War foreign policy-led defence rests on the analysis that Russia is no longer and willno longer pose a military threat to the Nordic-Baltic region of Europe for the foreseeable future. Sweden’s Nordicand Baltic neighbours are less willing than Sweden to embrace that analysis to the full extent that Sweden has, but2/3the view that Russia does not and will not pose a direct military threat to Northwestern Europe is widely shared bywell-respected analysts and government officials in not only the US, but also across most of Europe.Of course, all of this would not matter so very much if Sweden simply joined NATO, an unwillingness that may seempuzzling to outsiders. It is rooted in a domestic context in which the myth of Sweden’s golden post-war years ofeconomic prosperity and international moral standing has become closely tied to the myth of armed neutrality, inwhich Sweden alone stands between the East and the West, an upholder of world peace. So far, neither of the twobig political parties, the Moderate party or the Social Democrats, have been willing to challenge these myths. Notsurprisingly, opinion polls remain solidly against NATO membership. Moreover, Sweden’s Cold War history ofsuccessfully seeking security through secret bilateral cooperation with the US and some European NATO countriesalso helps to explain why Sweden’s leading political parties remain comfortable with this arrangement today, as theyseek security through informal bilateral ties to the US and other European countries via the EU, rather than officialmembership in NATO.However, the recent defence debate has not only outraged the Swedish public and been an internationalembarrassment for the country, but has also demonstrated the perils of conducting defence policy that lacks broadpublic support and understanding. Hopefully, these events will force Sweden’s leading political parties to engage –finally – in an open debate on Swedish defence policy in general and on the pros and cons of joining NATO inparticular. From the perspective of this author, such a debate is much overdue and of absolute necessity for anycountry that takes its security and defence policy seriously.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/14nrQYv _________________________________About the authorJan Joel Andersson – Swedish Institute of International AffairsDr. Jan Joel Andersson is Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs inStockholm and Dragas Distinguished Visiting Professor of International Studies at Old DominionUniversity in Norfolk, VA, USA.3/3

Sweden has effectively used bilateral co-operation with the US and other European states as an alternative to NATO membership.

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