On 24 April, Serbs were called to the polls only two years after the previous parliamentary contest, half-way through the government’s mandate. Reports in the international press focused on the elections being a test for the ruling party’s ‘pro-European’ positions against the advancement of the nationalist far right. Tena Prelec argues that this is only part of the picture, and far from being the most important matter

Prelec, Tena

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4/26/2016Serbian parliamentary election 2016: A gamble that almostbackﬁredblogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/04/26/serbian-parliamentary-election-2016-a-gamble-that-almost-backﬁred/On 24 April, Serbs were called to the polls only two years after the previous parliamentary contest,half-way through the government’s mandate. Reports in the international press focused on theelections being a test for the ruling party’s ‘pro-European’ positions against the advancement of thenationalist far right. Tena Prelec argues that this is only part of the picture, and far from being themost important matter.Last Sunday, another general election was held in Serbia, despite the regular ballot not being dueuntil 2018. This was the 15th time Serbian citizens were asked to vote for their parliament since1990 – an average of once every 1.6 years. There was no impending external crisis, no reason to doubt in thestability of the ruling party (secured by a landslide victory in 2014), and no grounds to argue that the government hadexhausted its mandate by fulﬁlling all its electoral promises. It was thus clear since the beginning that the voterepresented an attempt by Prime Minister Aleksander Vučić to bank on his current popularity in order to cement hishold on power.The 24 April parliamentary election was called alongside already planned local and regional elections. It isreasonable to believe that this constituted a further reason for Vučić to throw his hat in the ring in the hope that hisname on the lists will help the local branches of the party to gain better results. The PM’s leadership is as top-downin his party as it is in the government he leads, and indeed his popularity surpasses by far anyone else’s in the partyranks.This attempt, however, almost backﬁred. As the ﬁnal results ﬁnally came in, after a long and heavily criticised delayby the central electoral committee, it became clear that the forecasts tipping Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party(SNS) at over 50 per cent of the vote were not justiﬁed. The ﬁnal count has now settled at 48.2 per cent, a ﬁgureinferior to the 49.3 per cent achieved by the ruling party in 2014. The SNS will thus end up losing 27 seats inparliament, in spite of having this time joined forces with several minor parties. On paper, the SNS leadership isjubilant; behind the scenes, the real reaction may well be one of bitter disappointment.Table: Result of the 2016 Serbian parliamentary election and change in seats from 20141/4Note: Vote shares are rounded to one decimal place. There are 250 seats in the SerbianParliament. The change in seats refers to the change since the previous election in 2014. Formore information on the parties, see: Serbian Progressive Party (SNS); Socialist Party ofSerbia (SPS); Serbian Radical Party (SRS); Democratic Party (DS); Enough is Enough (DJB);DSS – Dveri. Source: Wikipedia, 25 April 2016. Table compiled by Bogdan Marković andEUROPP editors.Of the other parties, the Socialists (SPS) led by the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs and former PM Ivica Dačić incurredheavy losses, while the feared hemorrhaging of votes was limited in the case of the Democratic Party (DS). Threeformations that were previously absent have secured seats: the nationalist far right with the Serbian Radical Party(22 seats) and DSS – Dveri (13 seats), and ﬁnally the progressive movement Enough is Enough (16 seats).It is therefore striking that prior to the vote, opposition to Vučić’s SNS in the parliament was almost non-existent,considering that the SPS are de facto SNS allies, and that the only opposition that was present in parliament –consisting of the DS and its spin-oﬀ SDS – was heavily discredited. A much more composite picture isemerging after the April 2016 ballot: on the one hand, the nationalist far right is back on the sanctioned politicalscene; on the other, progressive political forces calling for the strengthening of democratic institutions, and for analternative European path to the one set out by the government, are now emboldened. Vučić is no longer the onlybastion of ‘Europeanness’ in Serbia (though the western press is yet to grasp that).So who is the real winner?There is no denying that the SNS is still the overwhelming force on Serbia’s political scene. A preference higher than40 per cent is something most western ruling formations can only dream of. Vučić’s appeal is certainly still strongamong the Serbian population, where the model of a ‘strong leader’ enjoys widespread adherence.Serbia’s PM, who was Minister of Information under war-time leader Slobodan Milošević and made his ﬁrst politicalsteps in Vojislav Seselj’s ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, has been particularly successful in using hisnationalist credentials to reassure the hard-line conservative fringes among the public that Serbia’s nationalinterests will be well protected. At the same time, he has pandered to the West and convinced European leadersthat if Serbia was to be set on the right course for European integration, he was the man for the job. They placedtheir trust in him – and still do, as evidenced by the congratulations which promptly came in from Johannes Hahn,Sebastian Kurz and others.However, considering the signiﬁcant disadvantages that exist in terms of media coverage and party funding, thesuccess of some minor parties is truly remarkable. One to watch out for is ‘Enough is Enough’ (DJB), led by2/4engineer Saša Radulović. In his short spell as Minister of the Economy under Vučić (September 2013 – January2014), Radulović endeavoured to clean Serbia’s ﬁnances by starting with public companies. Openly attackedby Vučić after deciding to stop several privatisation processes which were deemed to be dubious, Radulovićresigned and launched his own political movement. The new formation failed to pass the threshold in 2014, but morethan tripled its support in the 2016 contest.This may well mean enhanced visibility for DJB and an opportunity to truly start proﬁling themselves as a seriouspolitical alternative for those voters who are yearning for more transparency and pluralism, but were previouslydisappointed by other political actors such as Boris Tadić (former Serbian President and DS leader, now part of theCoalition for a Better Serbia). It will indeed be interesting to see whether DJB, the DS and the Coalition for a BetterSerbia will ﬁnd common ground to challenge the government, or if they will remain isolated voices. In the ﬁrstscenario, the progressives would stand much better equipped to make a meaningful impact at the next round ofelections.On the other side of the spectrum, the comeback of Šešelj’s SRS only weeks after his ﬁrst-grade acquittal by theInternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as well as the seats secured by DSS-Dveri, indicate thatSerbian nationalism and pro-Russian stances are still an important factor in the country. To a certain extent,this type of opposition plays into Vučić’s favour, as the PM can claim that he represents the only viable pro-European alternative for Serbia. In so far as this means putting a respectable face to a latent nationalist tendencyand attaching to it a pro-EU tag, he is probably right. The political game played by the PM so far has been a veryclever one and not without merits.  This pro-European versus pro-Russian divide, often implied by the international mainstream media when reportingthat Vučić’s victory was an ‘endorsement of EU policies‘, is, however, wide of the mark. For a start, even thoughVučić pays ample lip service to European integration, his past allegiances and present style of government do notquite match these stated intentions. The worrying state of independent media in Serbia (recently described by theOSCE as being ‘virtually non-existent’) and the PM’s undoubtedly autocratic way of understanding public oﬃcestand as a reminder of a governing style that should not be understood as conforming to European values – butthat, alas, is becoming increasingly common throughout the continent.Furthermore, Vučić has been markedly omnivore in choosing his allies. While keeping western leaders happy with amore lenient approach towards Kosovo, he has never reneged the traditional partnership with Russia, nor has hebacked out of securing new ties with the UAE, with China and with other foreign investors. Ultimately, this is notsomething he has ever attempted to hide, repeating on more than one occasion that economic interest is thenumber one criterion in his government’s line. This ‘Europe versus Russia’ narrative is therefore distinctly unhelpfulwhen trying to understand the political dynamics in Serbia and the wider region – lest it ends up overshadowingmore crucial issues.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics. Featured image: hungarytoday.hu.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1SGQOeQ _________________________________About the author3/4Tena Prelec – LSE / University of SussexTena Prelec is an Editor of EUROPP. She is a doctoral researcher at the University of Sussex andkeeps an active involvement in the LSE’s research unit on South Eastern Europe, LSEE.4/4

Serbian parliamentary election 2016: a gamble that almost backfired

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