The success of populist and Eurosceptic parties was one of the key narratives to emerge from the European Parliament elections in May. Ruth Wodak writes on the platforms which underpin these parties, noting that there is no one-size-fits-all explanation for why parties have gained ground in certain countries. Nevertheless she argues that it is difficult to predict where such a diverse range of movements will lead

Wodak, Ruth

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23/07/2014It would be dangerous to view modern European populismas a triumph of style over substanceblogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2014/07/23/it-would-be-dangerous-to-regard-modern-european-populism-as-devoid-of-serious-content-or-as-a-triumph-of-style-over-substance/The success of populist and Eurosceptic parties was one of the key narratives to emerge from theEuropean Parliament elections in May. Ruth Wodak writes on the platforms which underpin theseparties, noting that there is no one-size-fits-all explanation for why parties have gained ground incertain countries. Nevertheless she argues that it is difficult to predict where such a diverse range ofmovements will lead.The results of the elections to the European Parliament in May have caused great concern in thevarious national governments of European Union member states, as well as in the Europeanorganisations: although expected by opinion makers and predicted by opinion polls, it wasnevertheless surprising that the French extreme right-wing populist party the Front National (FN) won first place inFrance (with just under 24.9 per cent) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) first place in the UK (with27.5 per cent).The electoral success of these two Eurosceptic, nationalistic/chauvinistic and xenophobic parties dominated mediareactions across Europe and beyond, leading many politicians and journalists to proclaim the foreseeable end of theEuropean Union. In the midst of such outcries, other results were neglected and contradictory tendenciesoverlooked.For example, the Austrian extreme right-wing populist party Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) won fewer votes thanexpected and took third place (with around 20 per cent); in Italy Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party(which belongs tothe Party of European Socialists) almost doubled its seats whereas the extreme right lost more than 50 per cent oftheirs. In Sweden, the Socialists won the election and the governing conservative party lost more than 5 per cent; inGreece, the opposition left-wing Syriza gained over 22 per cent on its vote share from 2009. In Hungary, on theother hand, the extreme right-wing party Jobbikreceived just under 14.7 per cent.Making sense of the success of populist partiesObviously, we are dealing with contradictory tendencies across Europe that are not easily explained by North-Southor East-West cleavages. It is also obvious that the economic crisis did not influence the elections to similar effectsacross Europe: Austria and Denmark belong to the richest countries of the world and have some of the mostsuccessful right-wing populist parties. In these cases, the Austrian chauvinism and Danish protectionism of theirsocial welfare state are combined with xenophobic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Muslim beliefs and strong scepticismtowards the European Union. In other EU member states, however, the financial crisis certainly supported theemergence or re-emergence of parties similar to Neo-Nazi and fascist organisations (such as Golden DawninGreece and Jobbik in Hungary) who both also employ physical violence against migrants, Jews, and Roma. Theoverall election was ultimately won by the European People’s Party, albeit with massive losses, and the Party ofEuropean Socialists took second place.Speculations about the reasons for such developments are manifold – they range from a purported broaddisillusionment with politics per se andblaming governing parties for the global financial crisis, to discontentmentwith austerity politics and the growing gap between rich and poor. For most parties, the fear of migrants and asylum-seekers became a hegemonic agenda as well as a forceful argument for the necessity to protect the “ChristianOccident” as a constitutive part of European identity. In other cases, old traditional anti-Semitic, racist and anti-Ziganist prejudices were functionalised in order to construct scapegoats wherever and whenever needed.1/3Heinz-Christian ‘HC’ Strache, Credit: _dChris (CC-BY-SA-3.0)Furthermore, new media-savvy charismatic leaderssuch as Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage or the FPÖ’s HCStrache and their rhetoric are recognised as (at least apartial) cause of such success. And, finally, nationalisticoppositional interests were frequently played againstgoverning parties and their politics – hence transformingthe European elections into national elections. In short:there is no one explanation and no clear uni-directionaldevelopment to be identified in such complex andcontradictory results. Following the Dutch sociologistDick Pels, it would be dangerous and wrong to regardmodern populism as void of serious content or to reducethe new right-wing populism to a “frivolity of form, poseand style” and thus to downplay its outreach, itsmessages and resonance. Pels claims that “it isprecisely through its dynamic mix of substance andstyle that populist politics has gained an electoral leadposition in current media democracy”.Extreme right-wing populist parties are united in their endorsement of a chauvinist, nativist view of ‘the people’, aswell as by creating specific chauvinistic identity myths which idealise and rewrite history, and an anti-élistist,revisionist and anti-intellectual stance combined with strong Euroscepticism. Moreover, one can observe a tendencyto favour plebiscitarian methods and to downplay representative democracy while proclaiming the search for “truedemocracy” and denouncing “formalistic democracy”. Democracy should be reduced, such parties argue, to themajority rule of “the people”. By triggering such debates, populism might – as political scientist Ernesto Laclauclaims – possibly play a crucial role by re-politicising democracy. Of course, such parties struggle to definethemselves in terms of who belongs to the respective “people” and who does not. Belonging usually implies nativistcriteria rather than any kind of legal citizenship. In this way, the “real Austrians, Hungarians, British or Dutch” arejuxtaposed to “Others” (foreigners, non-Christians).However, the parties differ significantly in terms of their specific foci and historical as well as socio-political contexts:some parties gain support via an ambivalent relationship with fascistandNazi pasts (e.g. in Austria, Hungary, Italy,Romania and France); others focus primarily on a perceived threat from Islam (e.g. in the Netherlands, Denmark,Poland, Sweden and Switzerland); some parties restrict their propaganda to a perceived danger to their nationalidentities from ethnic minorities (e.g. in Hungary, Greece, Italy and the UK); and others primarily endorse atraditional Christian (fundamentalist) conservative-reactionary agenda (e.g. in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraineand Russia). Consequently, there is no one-size-fits-all explanation for this complex phenomenon.Europe’s futurePredicting future developments as a consequence of the EU elections 2014 is, of course, difficult. The much-discussed attempt to form a transnational extreme right-wing Populist Party seems doomed to fail: the overtlynationalistic orientation of such movements does not lend itself to any transnational or even cosmopolitan alliance.The above-mentioned different historical traditions and agenda also seem to prohibit any easy coalition or alliancedespite the existence of a common enemy – the European Union.On the other hand, a continuous normalisation of exclusionary agenda can be observed: instead of positioningoneself clearly against agendas such as immigration restrictions, historical revisionism or anti-feminism, somemainstream parties in government accommodate right-wing populist agendas and integrate these into theirprogrammes for fear of losing even more voters. In this way, they arguably opt for the wrong strategy as they willcertainly not convince more liberal voters, but instead lose them. Nor will they win back any voters they have already2/3lost to the right-wing populist parties. Such a dynamic was clearly observed in Austria, for example, where manyproposals of the FPÖ from 1992/1993 (for immigration restrictions and other policies), which were vehementlyopposed by the governments in office during the 1990s, have since been implemented by the governing GrandCoalition.It is also difficult to predict the consequence of the fact that European citizens were able to ‘elect’ the President of theCommission and the European Parliament for the first time. Many controversies among heads of state indicate thatit seems to be very difficult to accept the vote of the European citizens and to have lost the privilege of negotiatingimportant functions, strategies, and positions behind closed doors. These changes might lead to more transparencyof decision-making processes and thus, to a revival of interest in European political processes.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1rAYa8s _________________________________About the authorRuth Wodak – Lancaster UniversityRuth Wodak is Distinguished Professor and Chair of Discourse Studies at Lancaster University.3/3

It would be dangerous to view modern European populism as a triumph of style over substance

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