The United Kingdom Independence Party is in the process of appointing a new leader, following the resignation of Nigel Farage after the EU referendum. Simon Usherwood writes that in many respects the British Eurosceptic movement is now at a crossroads, having achieved its aim via the referendum, but still wanting to maintain a presence in British politics. He suggests that there are essentially three main paths open to British Eurosceptics in the aftermath of Brexit

Usherwood, Simon

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17/08/2016Is there still a point to UKIP? The future of BritishEuroscepticism post-Brexitblogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/08/17/is-there-still-a-point-to-ukip-the-future-of-british-euroscepticism-post-brexit/The United Kingdom Independence Party is in the process of appointing a new leader, following theresignation of Nigel Farage after the EU referendum. Simon Usherwood writes that in manyrespects the British Eurosceptic movement is now at a crossroads, having achieved its aim via thereferendum, but still wanting to maintain a presence in British politics. He suggests that there areessentially three main paths open to British Eurosceptics in the aftermath of Brexit.At a first cut, the 23 June referendum result was the clearest possible vindication of the many yearsof concerted action by British Eurosceptics: on a high turnout, a majority of people voted to leavethe EU, even if many of them wouldn’t have particularly described themselves as Eurosceptics. The result hasopened up a new path, out of the Union and into some new situation. Even if we don’t know what that situation mightbe, the mere knowledge of its existence will prove to be an attractive lure for others.And yet, in this moment of triumph there is a serious question for the British Eurosceptic movement: what is it for?For the quarter century since the Maastricht treaty, which crystallised critical British attitudes into a constellation ofgroups, there has been the critique – something’s wrong with the EU – and a solution – reform or exit thatorganisation. Now that the country is indeed exiting, both the casual observer and the academic scholar might ask:what happens next. Does the movement continue, change or die?Some contextBefore we can answer this question, it’s helpful to set out some context, of how the UK arrived at this place andwhere this place is. In many ways the UK has been the wellspring of Euroscepticism. This was the country thatinvented the very word, back in the 1980s, and saw the creation of the very first modern Eurosceptic groups at theend of that decade, building off Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech. The Maastricht treaty provided furthermobilisation opportunities, with a raft of groups from across the political spectrum being formed and creating thebasis for a much more critical political space in the UK for discussing European integration.Aided and abetted by a print press willing to give a platform to these groups and a succession of governments notprepared to go beyond reactive problem/crisis management with regard to the EU, Eurosceptics were able to setpublic agendas to a very considerable extent, even if their power to make decisions remained very limited.This last point is an important one, especially given the claims made by the likes of Nigel Farage after thereferendum. For all the media attention that more focused, single-issue Eurosceptics received, it was those politicalactors for whom Euroscepticism was only one part of their make-up who actually shaped the political trajectory vis-à-vis the EU. The path to the referendum is a case in point.The pressure from the 2000s on for popular referendums to underpin treaty reforms came from a broad spectrum,from those keen to build a stronger EU through to those wishing to slow or stop it. In the UK, the election of DavidCameron as leader of the Conservative party in 2005 and his backtracking on a referendum on Lisbon once it madeinto force in 2009 provided a clear opportunity for his backbenches to pressure him towards every more criticalpositions on the EU.That pressure came from a number of sources. The rise of UKIP from the late 2000s onwards had made some inthe Tory party nervous that their voter base was at risk. But just as important were factors more internal to the1/4Conservatives: the growing number of new MPs for whom Euroscepticism was a visceral part of their political being,drawing on a very-oversimplified image of Margaret Thatcher as an unbending critic of European integration.All of this points to a number of key conclusions that we need to keep in mind as we consider the future possibilities.First, Euroscepticism is clearly shaped by the context within which it operates. It is not the main driver of political orsocial change, but rather a marker of other forces, notably around dissatisfaction and disengagement, nationalismand identity politics, economic and social marginalisation.Second, there is no ‘Euroscepticism’, only Euroscepticisms. There is no positive ideological core to thisphenomenon, only the negative one of disliking some aspect of European integration. Instead, we find conservativesand socialists, greens and liberals, racists and libertarians all using their ideological bases to justify their attacks onthe EU. Those who consider the EU to be the whole problem and the sole problem can be counted on the fingers ofone hand.Third, and very much as a function of the first two points, Euroscepticism is contingent. As I have argued before, thisdoes not mean that it is ephemeral, but rather that while it provides a convenient proxy for other discontents, it hasachieved sufficient critical mass to transcend those specific discontents. Maybe the most useful analogy is of a relayteam, passing the baton from one to the next: however, this is a relay with no course or specific finish line.Three paths for British EuroscepticsWith this in mind, we might discern three main paths that the current Eurosceptic movement might move down. Thisis based on both the constellation of actors involved and the changing opportunity structures that presentthemselves. In particular, it recognises that with the securing of a Brexit majority in the referendum, we have nowmoved into a fundamentally different situation.This matters because it would appear to remove the key objective of the movement and thus the source of much ofthe mobilisation that has occurred. That mobilisation has three main elements, roughly equivalent to the point atwhich individuals became mobilised. The first element might be termed the ephemeral newcomers. The most recent supporters – those who only came tomatters as a result of the referendum campaign – are arguably the least engaged with the issue of Europeanintegration. While they might have been active in the Leave campaign, for many this was primarily an opportunisticmove to register discontent, either with the EU or with something else, such as the government.If we take a working assumption that 37% of the UK’s adult population (the 52% majority on the 71.8% turnout) isnot completely dissatisfied with the political system – and that would seem to be supported by the outcome of the2015 general election – then we would expect these recent Eurosceptics to disappear back into the generalpopulation. As I noted in a previous piece, there are serious questions – both political and academic – aboutwhether the Leave campaign could really be described as Eurosceptic, but even if we take a generous view, wewould still anticipate that the passing of the moment will see some activists being lost to the movement. The obviouscategory of people here would be those who now regret their choice in June. Second, there are the ideological masses. This group, which is probably the largest, are those of more longstanding: individuals who have been interested in the issue for some time and who might well have joined apressure group or political party prior to 2015. For them, the European issue is more central to their political make-up, but probably still only part of their political identity.As we know from various studies, even the most obvious destination for these people, UKIP, is a very broad church,in ideological terms. The party has no core ideology, only a shared negative of disliking the EU and, more latterly, ofuncontrolled immigration. This breadth is seen in the various polls that have shown a small minority of UKIPsupporters voting Remain, to take a more egregious example.2/4That breadth is seen across the Eurosceptic movement; indeed, it partly explains why there have been so manygroups formed over the past 25 years – there is as much to divide as to unite. Thus, all political parties have theirsceptics, as do trade unions, businesses and the rest. The organisational churn that has characterised themovement throughout its history will undoubtedly continue.However, in the changed context of Brexit, we might expect that the force and effort of this second group willbecome redirected. This follows a logic of “we’ve won this one, so on to the next fight, to achieve our goals”. Hereyou can take your pick about where the next fight might be, but we can offer some obvious locations.English nationalism has been highlighted by several observers as a very strong proxy for Euroscepticism and in thecontext of a revived Scottish independence movement the notion of enhancing (or even simply protecting) England’splace in the United Kingdom will become a more pressing issue. Add to this the scope for Northern Irish discontentover the reconstitution of the peace accords following Brexit and there is even more potential for Englishness tooccupy a more central position in political debate. It touches on many of the same nexus of issues asEuroscepticism: representation, proximity of decision-making, group identity and ‘fairness’.The immigration issue also still has much life in it, and even as the European dimension moves away from itscurrent central position, there will be substantial pressures to keep the broader question alive. The likely persistenceof high levels of immigration, whatever the regime for EU nationals, and the continued lack of central governmentpolicy to tackle the resolution of migration-related problems will provide a fertile ground for both more nativist andmore moderate expressions of displeasure and concern. UKIP made use of this in their expansion since the mid-2000s, and any new leader of the party might decide that this is their best bet for continued relevance.Finally, we might imagine that if there is a split in the Labour party between the Corbynistas and what used to beNew Labour, then there is potential for a general reshaping of the party political system in the UK. In this scenario,the main cleavage would be between liberal cosmopolitans and more reactionary elements. This would offer newopportunities for members of this section of the Eurosceptic movement to move more fully into the party politicalsystem, again influenced by their ideological preferences. The final group of Eurosceptics to consider are the true believers: those for whom the EU is their sole focus. Thisincludes the most long-standing individuals and those who have chosen to devote all of their energies to this onecause. Almost by definition, it is the smallest of the three segments we consider here, but it is also the mostobdurate and determined. Some years ago, I wrote about this group as the rock in the sand, the stable base aroundwhich others have built their efforts. For them, the EU is either all that they care about, or is so consuming that theymust see things through to the very end.With that in mind, we would expect that this group will be in the vanguard of policing Brexit negotiations, stoppingany backsliding in either overt or covert manner by the government. They have been the ones who have pushedhardest in the movement for speedy Article 50 notification, who have defended the result of the referendum mostheartily, who have the most detailed plans of how to move through this phase to a new situation and who will still beon this issue when most others have gone. Indeed, they will be the core of any post-Brexit anti-EU group that will beset up – much along the lines of Norway’s Nei til EU – to ensure that the UK does not drift back into the EU’s orbit.Concluding thoughtsThe British Eurosceptic movement is a creature of its age. Its formation and evolution have followed and – to somedegree – shaped the changing landscape of British politics. It is this basic characteristic that has informed this quickoverview and which will be borne out by whatever actually comes to pass.These changes again offer an excellent opportunity for us to consider what ‘Euroscepticism’ actually means (ifanything) and to consider the subtle and wide-reaching effects that it has on the domestic and European politicalorder. We stand at a crucial point in the development of Euroscepticism, as one country has chosen a path out of the3/4Union and Eurosceptics elsewhere have to make decisions about whether this is a path worth following. Even ifBritish Eurosceptics are unlikely to be the force that they once were, they might still find themselves role-models formany across the continent.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article originally appeared at EPERN and gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP –European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: © European Union2016 – European Parliament (CC-BY-SA-2.0)Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/2aYSmEa _________________________________About the authorSimon Usherwood – University of SurreySimon Usherwood is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Surrey and currently a SeniorFellow in the ESRC’s “UK in a Changing Europe” programme.4/4

Is there still a point to UKIP? The future of British Euroscepticism post-Brexit

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