Current discussions about politics – be it European, British, or American – almost inevitably end up being discussions about populism. Yet we know little about how populist parties communicate their messages. Focusing on this area, and drawing on extensive research from across Europe, Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Stromback, and Claes de Vreese share some key findings on populist political communication

Aalberg, Toril

De Vreese, Claes H.

Esser, Frank

Reinemann, Carsten

Stromback, Jesper

Aalberg, T.

Esser, F.

Reinemann, C.

Strömbäck, J.

de Vreese, C.H.

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

Us and them: How populist parties get their message across  

De Vreese, Claes

LSE Research Online

03/09/2016Us and them: How populist parties get their message acrossblogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/09/03/us-and-them-how-populist-parties-get-their-message-across/Current discussions about politics – be it European, British, or American – almost inevitably end up beingdiscussions about populism. Yet we know little about how populist parties communicate their messages. Focusingon this area, and drawing on extensive research from across Europe, Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, CarstenReinemann, Jesper Stromback, and Claes de Vreese share some key findings on populist politicalcommunication.In light of ongoing social, political, and economic turmoil – and recent populist backlashes against incumbentgovernments – the study of populism has perhaps never been more important. Yet existing research on populismtends to focus on parties and voters. To understand populism as an increasingly pervasive phenomenon inEuropean politics, it is just as crucial to study the characteristics and organisation of populist parties as theirelectoral foundation. Indeed, as the Brexit referendum showed, the communicative aspects are also key tounderstanding the electoral outcome.The Leave and Remain campaigns were able to make bold claims – not unusual for campaigns on Europeanmatters. However, populist political communication was also readily present: messages about self-serving elites,about out-groups – whether immigrants or the EU as a whole – were omnipresent, all while the campaigns wereeager to define themselves as representing the ‘ordinary people’. These elements fit strongly with current definitionsof populism.Almost a decade ago, colleagues Jagers and Walgrave suggested a distinction between different types of populism:complete populism, which includes reference and appeals to the people, anti-elitism, and exclusion of outgroups;excluding populism, which includes only reference and appeals to the people, and exclusion of outgroups; anti-elitistpopulism, which includes reference and appeals to the people together with anti-elitism; empty populism, whichincludes only reference and appeals to the people.Despite the plethora of definitions, references to, or the communicative construction of, “the people” should beregarded as the key component of populist messages, with anti-elitism and anti–outgroup stances serving asoptional additional elements. These elements can be combined in various ways, resulting in different types ofpopulism.Constructing an in-group of “the people” lies at the heart of populist political communication. “The people” can havedifferent meanings, and refer to the people as a sovereign group, as a class, as an ethnic group, as a nation etc.The additional elements – anti-elite and anti-outgroup messages – can be regarded as functional equivalents thatdefine the standard to which “the people” (“we”) are contrasted, and strengthen individual identification with the in-group – they foster in-group favouritism, and contribute to self-enhancement, reducing self-uncertainty.In current European scholarship there is a long list of case studies that help us understand the role of thecommunication strategies of, for example, Le Pen, Wilders or Orban. There are studies of how the media coverpopulist actors or launch campaigns themselves which are seen by some as expressions of the so-called mediapopulism. Even still, little systematic evidence is available on the specific role of communication.In light of this, the research in the new book Populist Political Communication in Europe is unique, covering workpublished in 24 languages. We show that on the side of populist actors we often find rhetoric that is emotional,includes blame attribution and scapegoats, uses straightforward and sometimes violent language, and presentssimplistic solutions to problems. Again, the essence of populist communication consists of references to the people,anti-elitism, and the exclusion of various out-groups. Such an understanding of populist political communication is1/3not merely theoretical but uses examples from several countries and finds empirical evidence of such strategies.Looking at the media and how they cover populist parties across Europe we also identify three cross-nationalpatterns: the previously limited coverage increased, often spurred by rising poll figures; with the increase incoverage we often see an increase in “negative” coverage – but given the anti-elite and anti-establishment feelingamong many citizens, such negative coverage is not actually always negative for populist actors; some mediaactively engage in critical coverage of populist actors out of concern for democracy. In this way, we can think aboutthe role of the media as populism by the media, populism through the media, and populist citizen journalism.As scholars we have a wealth of research in different countries. Much of this knowledge remains undisclosedbecause it is published in different languages. But at the same time, there is a quest for understanding the popularityof populist actors. This goes for Britain, but also for continental Europe and the US in light of its current presidentialcampaign. We believe that not only including but focusing on the communicative aspects of populism will help us tobetter understand one of the hallmarks of contemporary politics.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article draws on the authors’ edited book Populist Political Communication in Europe. The article givesthe views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London Schoolof Economics. It originally appeared at our sister site, British Politics and Policy at LSE.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/2c0bjrd _________________________________About the authorsToril Aalberg is Professor at the Department of Sociology and Political Science atthe Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim.  Frank Esser is Professor of International and Comparative Media Research at the University ofZurich.  Carsten Reinemann is Professor in the Department of Communication Studies and MediaResearch, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich.  Jesper Stromback is Professor in journalism and political communication at the University ofGothenburg.  2/3 Claes de Vreese is Professor and Chair of Political Communication in the Department ofCommunication Science at the University of Amsterdam.3/3

Us and them: how populist parties get their message across

Us and them: how populist parties get their message across

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International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

LSE Research Online