According to recent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov,Russia has claimed to be acting to protect the rights not just of citizens and military personnel, but also compatriots and Russian speakers in Crimea. But how far do Crimeans feel discriminated? Ellie Knott, a PhD student at the London School of Economics, draws on her research to answer this question

Knott, Eleanor

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blogs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2014/03/27/who-has-seized-power-in-crimea/Sergey Aksyonov is the de facto PrimeMinister of the Crimea who lead thecountry towards annexation to Russia.Eurocrisis in thePressWho has seized power in Crimea?By Ellie KnottAccording to recent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister,Sergei Lavrov,Russia has claimed to be acting to protect the rights not just of citizens and military personnel, butalso compatriots and Russian speakers in Crimea. But how far do Crimeans feel discriminated? Ellie Knott, a PhDstudent at the London School of Economics, draws on her research to answer this question.In a previous article for Vostok Cable, I argued that there needed to be a more nuanced understanding of Russianidentity in Crimea. Hence I differentiated between ethnic Russians who accept or enjoy living in a Ukrainian state,and Discriminated Russians, who identify not just as ethnically Russian but also as the victims of Ukrainisation.It is the latter who have been heavily involved with pro-Russia movements,such as Russkaia Obschina Kryma(Russian Community of Crimea), and thepro-Russia minority party, Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity). There has beena long-standing cynical attitude to these organisation in Crimea: that theyare professional Russians. As one respondent described these individualswant “to get money from this” by using their Russian identification as anoccupation to profit from the funding for these organisations which comesfrom Russia.It is these same Russian cultural and political organisations who have led therenewed separatist movement in Crimea. As soon as Sergei Aksenov, theleader of Russkoe Edinstvo, seized power, he claimed to be representing theinterests of all Crimeans. However Russkoe Edinstvo were elected by just4% of the electorate in the 2010 Crimean parliamentary elections.*Aksenov was able to seize power as the Prime Minister of Crimea after aforced vote in the Crimean parliament. The identity and origin of the armedgroup who stormed the Crimean parliament on 27 February, forcing the voterlater in the day, remain unknown. However the links between RusskoeEdinstvo and the Russian administration run deep, both at the local level with personal links to the Russianconsulate in the peninsula, through the organizational structure of the Compatriot policy, and several individualsfrom these groups have been awarded cultural and social medals by the Russian Federation for their work.In the election materials of Russkoe Edinstvo, the idea of discrimination against Russians in Crimea is a majormotivation. Hence their electoral platform in 2010 focused primarily on protecting the “humanitarian rights ofRussians and Russian-cultural Crimeans”. In the leaflets of Molodie, the youth wing of Russkoe Edinstvo, theyclaimed also that they needed to defend themselves against “enemies of the Russian world” who were trying to“oppress and kill Russian language and culture”. This discourse of discrimination, and its link to the minorityRussian separatists, existed in Crimea well before the world’s attention shifted there. The difference now is thatthe pro-Russian authorities, with the help of the Russian government, and likely the military, have made thisdiscourse go viral, with Russia mirroring the mantra of Russkoe Edinstvo by claiming that it is legitimate to act toprotect the “humanitarian rights” of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea.Perceptions of discrimination were common among just a minority of ethnic Russians that I interviewed in Crimeain 2012-2013. They were angered by what they saw as Ukraine’s “forced” Ukrainisation policies which hadinfringed on the “rights of Russians” because “priority” was now given to Ukrainian language in society andSoldiers wearing no identifying insignia have rapidly seizedcontrol of Crimea’s military facilities after Yanukovic wasoverthrown in Kiev.education. They were angered because of the decline of Russian language in schools. But also because even inRussian language schools, they were required to teach what they perceived to be a “totally Ukrainian” version ofhistory which required them to teach the “history of collaborators” in the second world war, such as StepanBandera and Roman Shukhevych.While Stepan Bandera is lauded as a Ukrainian national hero in western Ukraine, in the east and south, and inCrimea, he is depicted as a fascist collaborator, working against the Soviet Union. This idea of Ukrainiannationalism and nationalisation of the state is depicted as analogous to fascism, by this very small pro-Russiangroup who in the first few days of protests in Crimea mobilised under the slogan of “down with fascism”. In recentdays, posters have also appeared in Sevastopol indicating that the referendum is a choice between Russia andfascism.It is easy to dismiss claims of discrimination as ridiculous given the advantages currently enjoyed by those with apro-Russian stance, but it is interesting also to reflect on how far feelings of discrimination resonate more broadlyin Crimean society. Few I interviewed, outside of those who were pro-Russia, described feeling discriminated interms of Russian language and culture in peninsula. In large part because they felt Russian was majority cultureand language in the peninsula and protected by the local government. Russian culture and language were notperceived as under threat because the Russian “question” was rarely seen as an “acute issue”.The only example that was often cited by respondents was their dissatisfaction with an all-Ukrainian law thatrequired foreign films in cinemas to be dubbed in Ukrainian, rather than Russian. But as one respondentdescribed it, this was not a “strangulation of Russian culture” but “just a bad law”. In all other aspects of life,respondents felt comfortable in the ability to perform their daily functions in Russian language.*The pro-Russia organisations involved in the seizure ofpower in Crimea are acting again as “professional Russians”.Discrimination was a convenient rhetoric for theseprofessionals because these feelings already resonated witha minority of the population, embedded by economicperipheralisation in post-Soviet Crimea. This discriminationdiscourse was convenient to legitimise their newly seizedauthority and disguise the other motivations behind the powergrab, such as protecting Russia’s military assets in thepeninsula.It is unclear what Professional Russians would gain frombeing part of the Russian Federation or a frozen conflictbetween Russia and Ukraine. But at least in the short termthey are able to service their own economic and politicalinterests, while indicating that troops, who remain unmarked but are likely Russian, were needed forthe referendum to act as a “stabilising” influence to ensure “public order”. Reprisals against those investigatingand questioning the newly empowered pro-Russian separatists are already on the rise, suggesting that Crimea’sfuture is not only uncertain but daunting, having empowered militarised elements, such as Cossack groups, to actviolently without repercussions towards dissenters, and in particular towards Crimean Tatars and journalists. This article was originally posted on Vostok Cable on 18 March 2014_____________________Ellie Knott is a PhD student in the Department of Government at LSE researching Romanian kin-state policies inMoldova and Russian kin-state policies in Crimea (@ellie_knott).Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog, nor of theLondon School of Economics_____________________Related articles in LSE Euro Crisis in the Press:Not all Ethnic Russians in Crimea Have a Political Affinity with MoscowBalancing UkraineTaming the Bear? Germany and Europe’s Fragile Eastern Frontier 

Who has seized power in Crimea?

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