Romania has witnessed large anti-government protests over a proposed amnesty for prisoners which has the potential to free several officials currently in jail for corruption. Daniel Brett lays down the background, explaining that attacks on Romania’s anti-corruption efforts have been threefold, coming through the legislative process, through a domestic campaign against the anti-corruption directorate (DNA) and its chief prosecutor Laura Codruța Kövesi, and via criticism of the DNA outside of Romania

Brett, Daniel

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02/02/2017Romania’s protests: A response to a three-pronged assault onanti-corruption measuresblogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/02/02/romanias-protests-a-response-to-a-three-pronged-assault-on-anti-corruption-measures/Romania has witnessed large anti-government protests over a proposed amnesty for prisonerswhich has the potential to free several officials currently in jail for corruption. Daniel Brett lays downthe background, explaining that attacks on Romania’s anti-corruption efforts have been threefold,coming through the legislative process, through a domestic campaign against the anti-corruptiondirectorate (DNA) and its chief prosecutor Laura Codruța Kövesi, and via criticism of the DNAoutside of Romania.Protests in Romania have seen over 150,000 people take to the streets in Bucharest, alongside300,000 in the rest of the country, building on demonstrations that began at the end of January against thegovernment. The protests were in opposition to a proposal to grant an amnesty for prisoners, which includes somepoliticians jailed for corruption, as well as to decriminalise some corruption offences including where the moneyinvolved is less than 200,000 lei (£38,000). Despite the protests, the Romanian government at 10pm on 31 Januaryagreed to pass the amnesty and then published the law at 3am.More protests immediately followed in Bucharest. The way in which the law was proposed and passed, and thereasons why the law was passed are causing deep alarm and anger in Romania at the government, and fearsabout the future direction of the country. The law, which took the form of an emergency ordinance (and so did nothave to go through parliament – nor can it be blocked by the President) is seen by the protesters as an attempt bythe governing Social Democratic Party (PSD) to free many of its politicians and backers who are currently in jail andto remove a conviction against current PSD leader Liviu Dragnea.Meanwhile, the decriminalisation of certain acts of corruption has been viewed as an attempt to prevent futureprosecutions by the country’s anti-corruption directorate (DNA). In a chilling echo of the Colectiv Fire of November2015, which killed 64 people and was in part attributed to corruption that allowed an unsafe nightclub to operate,another fire at a Bucharest nightclub in January resulted in 44 people going to hospital and brought the issue ofcorruption to the forefront of politics again.The ordinances are important because of how the Romanian legal system works. Once an ordinance is published inMonitorul Oficial, then it is law. Even if it is repealed five minutes later, for those five minutes, anything that wasdone under the law is legal. So if the ordinances were to be published and in five minutes the governmentamnestied Dragnea and the PSD supporters in jail and then the ordinance were repealed, the amnesty would stillapply because the amnesty was ‘legal’ when it took place.In a state where it has taken 27 years for former PSD President Ion Iliescu to be charged with crimes againsthumanity for bringing the miners onto the streets to crush pro-democracy demonstrations, and where anti-corruptionefforts have been constantly thwarted and undermined, this law, with its wide ranging implications, shows howshallow democracy is embedded in Romanian politics. It also demonstrates how willing actors are to manipulate thelaw in search of their own interests.Controversially, Romania’s President, Klaus Iohannis, joined the protesters. For the PSD, this was further evidencethat Iohannis is attempting a coup d’etat. Indeed, he has even been accused by some of setting the nightclub on fireas part of a conspiracy to remove the government. For many protesters, his appearance was unwelcome, firstly forseeming to try and take over what was a grassroots protest drawn from all sections of society, and secondly,because this seemed like a repeat of the Colectiv Protests when Iohannis went onto the streets and made promises1/4Liviu Dragnea. Credits: PSD (CC BY 2.0)that did not come to fruition and in retrospect seemed to be largely an attempt to take the sting from the protests.The new PSD government: same old PSD? Following the fall of the Ponta government after theColectiv Protests, the PSD regrouped under the newleadership of Liviu Dragea. Dragnea is a controversialpolitician, with a reputation for corruption andauthoritarianism, and his leadership was opposed bysome within the PSD including Ion Iliescu. Dragnea wasable to take control of the party. Despite leaving officefollowing Colectiv, the PSD has come back and a littleover a year later, it has a majority in the parliament withits allies and with most mayors and local councils undertheir control.Dragnea’s leadership of the PSD has been highly-effective. Since coming to power, he has carefullyrecrafted the party and promoted many youngermembers, including the former journalist Gabriela Firea(now mayor of Bucharest) and new Prime Minister SorinGrindeanu. Given how reluctant many older politiciansare to leave the stage this represents a rare opportunity. However, they are all aware that they owe their position toDragnea and their loyalty is the price of promotion. Dragnea, like Ponta before, is seen as a descurcăreţ (streetsavvy): someone who has outsmarted the system and for some this is something to be admired.Dragnea’s effective leadership has been combined with ineffective leadership from the opposition. The lack ofsubstantive reform from the technocratic government of Dacian Ciolos alienated many people who had protestedfollowing Colectiv. Moreover, the PSD, in alliance with the Romanian Orthodox Church, were able to control theagenda surrounding the parliamentary elections.Rather than the elections being framed around the issue of corruption and social reform as presidential electionshave been, the debate was around a proposal to change the constitution to ban same sex marriage. This forced theNational Liberal Party (PNL) and the newly formed Union to Save Romania (USR) to take sides on the issue,splitting their support, while the traditionally older and more socially conservative PSD voters stayed with them.Turnout was low in both the local and parliamentary elections, reflecting a wider alienation with parties, but onewhich the PSD was able to exploit.The government claims that the amnesty is a response to chronic over-crowding in Romanian prisons, however,there has been much confusion over who will be amnestied, and the question is why go through the procedure of anemergency ordinance rather than via parliament unless it was to avoid scrutiny or debate? Likewise, there has beenno debate or scrutiny over the changes to the penal code.In their opening remarks to Parliament, Dragnea and his ally, Alliance of Liberals and Democracts (ALDE) leaderCălin Popescu-Tăriceanu, laid out their cards early on. Dragnea attacked the constitution for debarring him from thePrime Ministership, while Tariceanu who is under investigation for corruption, attacked the DNA. Thus the majorpolicy objectives – Dragnea securing the Prime Ministership and reversing anti-corruption legislation were clear.As well as his conviction for electoral fraud, Dragnea is also under investigation for corruption. Although the case ismoving slowly, a second conviction would see him sent to jail (first convictions for corruption do not result in jailsentences) almost certainly ending his hopes of being Prime Minister.2/4Laura Kövesi, chief prosecutor of Romania’s DNA.Just as the leader of the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) Jarosław Kaczynski believes that the new USadministration will have no interest in involving itself in Polish politics, it seems clear that the PSD leadership believethat the same applies to Romania. The US and EU have both been involved in protesting attempts to unpick anti-corruption legislation. With the US looking inwards, and perhaps no longer interested in anti-corruption efforts, it fallson the EU and Romanians themselves to attempt to stop any such attempts. With parliament and many institutionsunder the control of the PSD and its allies, street protests are one of the few methods open to the population.A three pronged assault on anti-corruption measuresWhile attention has focused on the ordinances, moves against anti-corruption have opened up in three areas:through the legislative process, through a domestic campaign against the DNA, and via criticism of the DNA outsideof Romania.The DNA has been subject to intense criticism in theRomanian media, led by the RTV station owned by theformer PSD (now far-right United Romania Party –PRU) politician Sebastian Ghiţă. The allegations haveincluded claims that Laura Codruța Kövesi, the DNA’schief prosecutor, plagiarised her thesis, and a leak oftapes involving her deputy and Ghiţă alleging they areforeign agents. The aim has been to cast the DNA ascorrupt and as a political tool, while arguing that theprosecutions are anti-democratic.A second strand of this narrative seeks to minimisecorruption by the PSD by claiming that all politicians arecorrupt. The suggestion is that there is little realdifference between any of the parties, which in part iswhy turnout has been so low in the local and nationalelections. But the DNA has also been subject to criticismin a third area: the foreign press, where the PSD andtheir supporters have made effective use of the western media to either praise Dragnea or attack the DNA’s actions.These contributions cast the DNA as a ‘new Securitate’, arguing that it is being used as a tool by the governmentagainst democratic opposition. This perspective at best omits many important details and at worst plays fast andloose with the facts. Corruption cases in Romania take many years and the Romanian court system is notoriouslyslow. Furthermore, many of those under investigation have taken various steps to avoid facing court and going to jail– including fleeing the country, faking illness, apparent suicide attempts, as well as more mundane legal stallingprocedures.The attempt by the Romanian government to extradite Alexander Adamescu from the UK for corruption has drawnattention from the British press, including allegations that the Romanian security services attempted to kidnap hiswife. While this may make for a juicy story, it does not seem very likely. Such articles certainly do not make mentionof the hostility towards the DNA and anti-corruption efforts by the current government and its supporters.Furthermore, they ignore that those primarily subject to investigation by the DNA are from the governing party –likewise they omit that figures from all parties have been subject to investigation, arrest and conviction.We have a situation where in Romania, the government presents the DNA and anti-corruption efforts as a keyopponent, while outside Romania, opponents of the DNA portray it as a tool of government oppression.But why muddy the waters? If the calculation is that the US is no longer interested in intervening in Romaniandomestic politics, then the weight of resisting these ‘anti-anti-corruption’ efforts and democratic backsliding falls on3/4the EU. And by lobbying hard in the media and elsewhere against the DNA (as well as recasting Dragnea as amodern tolerant social democratic leader), the aim may be to split the major EU states and weaken any action thatthe EU may take against Romania should Dragnea and the PSD be successful in attacking and dismantling theDNA.A power grab or something else?On the one hand, the events of the last couple of weeks could be seen simply as a government over-reaching. Onthe other hand, one could read into it a more concerted and worrying pushback against anti-corruption efforts. Theapproach taken seems intentionally provocative and may confirm all the worst suspicions about the PSD-ALDEalliance. Perhaps with Dragnea’s court case approaching and increasing demands from within the party for favoursto be repaid, there was an incentive to drive through these measures.Having gained power, this may be the start of a wider attempt to consolidate the control the PSD now holds. ThePSD is simultaneously weak and strong, it is strong in that it controls parliament and many other institutions, but it isperpetually vulnerable to anti-corruption efforts removing actors and undermining its hold on these institutions. Thusattacking anti-corruption efforts may be the only way in which their control can be maintained.It remains to be seen what will happen with the ordinances, President Iohannis has promised a referendum on themand is looking to the constitutional court, while the People’s Advocate (responsible for representing the people) isunder the control of the PSD and is resisting demands to send them for scrutiny. Street protests are going tocontinue, however, and the government may well be banking on the protesters quickly losing interest and returninghome after a few days (as happened after Colectiv) allowing normal service to be resumed.With the State Department in a state of flux, and the EU distracted by Brexit, the US and events in Poland andHungary, it remains to be seen how much (if any) foreign pressure will be exerted on Romania. The government hastoo much invested in this to back down and is potentially using it as a test of strength. For many in the government,the removal of the Ponta government after Colectiv was a sign of weakness and should not be repeated. It wasseen as giving into the streets, thus the current situation could be viewed as an overt attempt to assert their authorityover civil society and the population.Even if the ordinances are rescinded, the medium term direction of Romanian politics looks set to be a battle overanti-corruption measures and how extreme the government will become in order to unpick those measures.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics. Featured image: the protest in Bucharest on 1 February 2017, by Dan MihaiBalanescu. _________________________________About the authorDaniel Brett – Open UniversityDaniel Brett is an Associate Lecturer at the Open University, he has previously taught at IndianaUniversity and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He works on contemporaryRomania, rural politics and historical democratisation.4/4

Romania’s protests: a response to a three-pronged assault on anti-corruption measures

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