Serbia’s ruling party, the SNS, has announced that their candidate at this spring’s presidential election will be none other than the Prime Minister himself – Aleksandar Vučić. Will this bold move allow the SNS to keep their hold on power? Tena Prelec outlines the scenarios, taking stock of the controversies that have accompanied Serbian politics over the past year

Prelec, Tena

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15/02/2017Serbian presidential election 2017: Can Vučić pull a Putin-Medvedev?blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/02/15/can-vucic-pull-a-putin-medvedev/Serbia’s ruling party, the SNS, has announced that their candidate at this spring’s presidentialelection will be none other than the Prime Minister himself – Aleksandar Vučić. Will this bold moveallow the SNS to keep their hold on power? Tena Prelec outlines the scenarios, taking stock of thecontroversies that have accompanied Serbian politics over the past year.The presidential election due to take place in Serbia this spring promises to be a significant affair.Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić had already stated that if his preferred candidate does not win, hewill step down from his post. In recent times, the choice of politicising and personalising a ballot hasbackfired for three European PMs – David Cameron, Matteo Renzi and Boyko Borisov – so it will be interesting tosee whether Vučić can pull this one off.So high are the stakes that Vučić has eventually decided to stand himself, as announced by the Serbian ProgressiveParty (SNS) on 14 February. This means that the ruling party will not back the current President Tomislav Nikolić inhis bid for re-election. The choice has allegedly come on the back of public opinion research which has eveninvolved showing three different electoral spots, with different candidates, and seeing how respondents reacted.Why is the PM so preoccupied with keeping control over the institutions, given the relatively wide majority heenjoys? In part, this is to be attributed to his style of governing: he adopts an undeniably top-down, controllingapproach. And yet, dismissing these concerns as the caprices of an ego-maniac would obscure significantinternecine developments that have occurred within Vučić’s block.Rumours hinting at internal fractions within the ruling coalition seem to have found confirmation in the fact that it tookalmost four months for Vučić to form a government after last year’s election. The PM himself had stated that he‘can’t form a government with backstabbers’ (presumably hinting at the Socialist Party of Serbia – SPS), that ‘thelong wait is not just a whim, there are serious problems’, and that ‘the government might be formed by someone elsein case he fails’, thus feeding rumours that external pressures – perhaps from Russia or from the West – weredetermining the spheres of influence. Either way, there is little doubt that at least two internal factions that arefighting over posts and resources are giving the PM a hard time in keeping the desired control.On the other hand, keeping a constant atmosphere of tension plays favourably in convincing voters that Serbianeeds a strong hand. Speaking of the upcoming presidential election, the PM has depicted the country’s situation instark terms, as a choice of the path Serbia will take in the future. Politically, the intention here is certainly to presenthimself (once again) as the only candidate who can keep Serbia firmly on the road towards European integration. Inthe past, he has been able to obtain the trust of western leaders and of the EU institutions, and there is no real signof this support faltering for now.1/3Aleksandar Vučić. Credits: Zoran Žestić / Tanjug (CC BY-SA 4.0)Indeed, Vučić has been skilled in ensuring that his mix of credentials (a nationalist turned European reformist) makehim ideally placed to carve a large middle ground encompassing citizens with a positive vision of the EU and thosewho place themselves on the right of the political spectrum, who prefer a ‘strong leader’ and are partial tonationalistic rhetoric.As for the challengers, among the first to announce their candidature was Vuk Jeremić, a former Minister of ForeignAffairs who is said to have had his eyes set on the presidential ballot for a while, recently running a solid race for thepost of UN Secretary General with the likely knowledge that his chances of getting through were rather low, butlaying the ground for a new contest. A Cambridge and Harvard graduate and an anti-Milošević dissident in his earlydays in politics, Jeremić describes himself as ‘fervently pro-European’, but is also a figure capable of garneringsome enthusiasm from nationalist-minded Serbs due to his strenuous commitment to keep Kosovo part of Serbiawhile he was at the Foreign Ministry.More recently, Serbia’s Ombudsman Saša Janković announced his already expected candidature after handing inthe official resignation from his post. Janković stated that he is standing for President to ‘return meaning to thatinstitution, ensuring that it serves all citizens, and not only one man’. He is expected to elicit support from theliberally-minded opposition in urban centres and has received the backing of the Democratic Party (DS). It ishowever yet unclear – though at this point unlikely – whether another opposition candidate, Miroslava Milenović ofEnough is Enough, will stand as well. Jeremić, Janković and (potentially) Milenović would be competing for the voteof broadly similar portions of the electorate.And then there is Vojislav Šešelj, the head of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party who has only recently been acquittedby the ITCY, where he was tried on nine counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Šešelj, who verypublicly rooted for Donald Trump in the run up to the US elections, is expected to attract a sizeable share of the vote(about 10 percent) in the first round in case he will throw his hat in the ring. Finally, Boško Obradović, leader of thefar-right party Dveri, has also announced he will stand.The presidential election – a two-round affair – foreseen for the spring is therefore bound to be another testingground for the ruling coalition and for the opposition alike. Currently, polls give Vučić near-certainty of victory,perhaps even in the first round. A question remains, however, as to whether Vučić’s appeal will be enough in a2/3hypothetical second round, as opposition voters would in that case certainly unite around either Jeremić or Janković,should one of them reach second place.Serbia’s voters, and especially those from the country’s capital, are not unanimous in their affection for the PM. Hisparty had already lost some ground at the parliamentary elections last April , after which scandals involving allegedvote-rigging and the illegal demolition of houses in the centre of Belgrade triggered widespread demonstrations andfed civil society’s discontent towards the government. It is also worth noting that the mayor of Belgrade, Siniša Mali,a member of the ruling party and close Vučić ally, is once again at the centre of corruption allegations – this timebeing directly accused by his ex wife. However, while the ruling party’s appeal might have started to falter in urbancentres, Vučić’s party remains strong in the countryside. Big shifts in power look unlikely for now.If Vučić manages to change roles in power, in a reverse version of what Putin did in Russia in 2012, we don’t knowas yet who might be the present-day Medvedev to replace him as Prime Minister. Another open question is whethernew parliamentary elections will accompany the presidential ballot – a possibility that has already been raised by thePM. It would be the 16th time Serbian citizens have been asked to vote for their parliament since 1990: another year,another electoral drama.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics. _________________________________About the authorTena Prelec – LSE / University of SussexTena Prelec is an Editor of EUROPP and a doctoral researcher at the University of Sussex.3/3

Serbian presidential election 2017: can Vučić pull a Putin-Medvedev?

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