In many respects, Indian lands in the US can be considered to be a country within a country. With many tribal governments having their own law enforcement agencies there is a risk of jurisdictional conflict with agencies outside of Indian Country. Thaddieus W. Conner and Stephanie L. Witt take a close look at cross-deputization agreements between law enforcement agencies which allow officers from tribal, state, and local agencies to actively respond to issues regardless of jurisdictional boundaries. They find that the major determinants of such cooperation are the presence of Indian gaming, higher rates of violent crime, as well as organizational resources and capacity

Conner, Thaddieus W.

Witt, Stephanie L.

LSE Research Online

9/5/2016Why some tribal governments are more likely to partner withstate and local law enforcement than others.blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2016/09/05/why-some-tribal-governments-are-more-likely-to-partner-with-state-and-local-law-enforcement-than-others/In many respects, Indian lands in the US can be considered to be a country within a country. Withmany tribal governments having their own law enforcement agencies there is a risk of jurisdictionalconflict with agencies outside of Indian Country. Thaddieus W. Conner and Stephanie L. Witt takea close look at cross-deputization agreements between law enforcement agencies which allowofficers from tribal, state, and local agencies to actively respond to issues regardless of jurisdictionalboundaries. They find that the major determinants of such cooperation are the presence of Indiangaming, higher rates of violent crime, as well as organizational resources and capacity. There are more than 300 federally recognized Native American tribal governments in the contiguousUnited States today, with jurisdiction over about 1 million people. These tribal governments oftenhave their own courts and law enforcement; more than half of all tribal governments which have lawenforcement agencies have entered into cross-deputization agreements with neighboring non-tribalgovernments to administer justice more efficiently and effectively across jurisdictions. Cross-deputization agreements allow law enforcement officers from tribal, state, and/or local lawenforcement agencies to actively respond to issues regardless of jurisdictional boundaries. Withoutsuch agreements, determining who has jurisdiction in Indian Country is fraught with complexity due in large part tothe sovereign rights of tribes that predate the US Constitution and the “discovery” of the Americas.Cross-jurisdictional agreements between tribal and non-tribal law enforcement agencies help bring actors togetherto overcome a long history of conflict; discovering collaborative solutions to common problems. However, fewstudies have explored what drives cooperation between tribal and non-tribal officials in the US, with tribalgovernments becoming an increasingly active player in the intergovernmental relations framework. We attempt to fillthis void by examining how capacity, problem severity, and economic development helps explain the adoption ofcross-jurisdictional agreements between tribal, state, and local law enforcement agencies using data provided bythe Bureau of Justice Statistics.One major determinant of cross-jurisdictional cooperation between tribes and local governments in the area of lawenforcement is the presence of Indian gaming. Since the signing of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, morethan 200 tribal governments have adopted Class III “Las Vegas style” gaming that includes high stakes table gamessuch as poker and blackjack as well as electronic slot machines. Both positive and negative impacts are associatedwith gaming including increases in income and employment on tribal land in the case of the former, and perceivedincreases in crime and addiction in the case of the latter. The dramatic increase in tourism and visitors to manyNative nations requires an increased presence of tribal law enforcement to help maintain law and order. As a result,we find a higher likelihood of cooperation between tribal and neighboring non-tribal governments in the presence ofClass III casinos. Given that the challenges associated with an increase in patrons to Native communities oftentranscend a single jurisdiction, collaboration between tribal and non-tribal law enforcement personnel would appearto provide a window of opportunity for intergovernmental cooperation that might not materialize under otherconditions.1/3Another central determinant of intergovernmental partnerships between tribal and non-tribal law enforcementagencies is the presence of organizational resources and capacity. Non-tribal jurisdictions with diminished capacityin the way of insufficient numbers of personnel and lower spending on law enforcement per capita are more likely toenter into a cooperative agreement with tribal law enforcement in the immediate area than states and counties withgreater organizational capacity. This reflects a very strategic decision on the part of state and local actors who maylack the capital necessary to accomplish specific tasks and are willing to share jurisdiction in order to moreeffectively achieve their goals. Conversely, we find that tribes with cross-deputization agreements with neighboringlocal law enforcement tend to be much better off socioeconomically than tribes without agreements. Deputizedtribes would thus appear to be providing an important service to surrounding non-Indian communities that may needassistance.Finally, problem severity also plays a role in determining the extent to which actors will seek out other agencies inthe external environment to work together. Collaboration often surrounds what are referred to as “wicked problems,”or problems that lack easy solutions, which often defy the ability of a single organization to address alone. In suchpolicy areas, collaboration is much more likely as single actors scan the external environment for help in solvingseemingly intractable problems. We find this to be the case in explaining tribal-local law enforcement partnershipswhere there is a higher likelihood of adopting cross-deputization agreements in states and counties with high ratesof violent crime. This relationship is significant even when controlling for the size and capacity of the lawenforcement agencies in the state. As a result, problem severity appears to be an important catalyst in facilitatingintergovernmental partnerships between tribes and non-tribal actors in the United States.Our work provides an important glimpse into what drives cooperation in Indian Country, but more is needed to fullyunderstand how these factors influence cross-jurisdictional partnerships in other policy areas involving tribalgovernments including health policy, economic development, environmental regulation, and even education. Suchpartnerships can help overcome a history of conflict between Native nations and state governments that haveserved as barriers to progress in finding joint solutions to common problems.This article is based on the paper, ‘The Role of Capacity and Problem Severity in Adopting VoluntaryIntergovernmental Partnerships: The Case of Tribes, States, and Local Governments’, in State and LocalGovernment Review.Featured image credit: arbyreed (Flickr, CC-BY-NC-2.0)2/3Please read our comments policy before commenting.           Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, northe London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/2c1FRV4 _________________________________ About the authorsThaddieus W. Conner – New Mexico State UniversityThaddieus W. Conner is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at New MexicoState University. His research focuses on collaborative public management, intergovernmentalrelations, and federal Indian policy in the United States. He has recently published articles in PublicAdministration Review, The American Review of Public Administration, and Public Administration onissues concerning tribal-local partnerships in the area of Indian education in public schools.Stephanie L. Witt – Boise State UniversityStephanie L. Witt is a Professor in the School of Public Service at Boise State University. Her booksinclude The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations 3rd edition (with Elizabeth Fredericksen andDavid Nice), Cities, Sagebrush, and Solitude (with Dennis R. Judd), People Skills for PublicManagers (with Suzanne McCorkle) and Human Resource Management The Public ServicePerspective (with Elizabeth Fredericksen, W. David Patton, and Nicholas Lovrich).CC BY-NC 3.0 2015 LSE USAPP3/3

Why some tribal governments are more likely to partner with state and local law enforcement than others.

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