Chidi Anselm Odinkalu discusses the challenging issues facing African Heads of States at the Africa Union Summit taking place from 22-31 January 2017

Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm

LSE Research Online

19.1.2017Après Zuma: Can the African Union Save Itself?#28thAUSummitblogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/01/19/apres-zuma-can-the-african-union-save-itself-28thausummit/Chidi Anselm Odinkalu discusses the challenging issues facing African Heads of States at the Africa UnionSummit taking place from 22-31 January 2017.The African Union (AU) has until its Summit in Addis Ababa from 22-31 January 2017 to rescue itself frominstitutional sclerosis. A coincidence of fiscal, succession, diplomatic and governance crises jostling for theattention of its forthcoming summit will afford the bi-annual conclave of Africa’s rulers a rare opportunity to re-invent the organisation or risk irrelevance. Without a reputation, however, for bold, imaginative decision making,the odds remain slim that the outcome of the summit will be anything more than business as usual. That will be adebacle for the organisation and the continent.A fiscal crisis long in the makingAs with many things, the origins of the AU’s crises begin with money. For too long, it has been quite poorlyfunded. Many sub-regional organisations, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)and, for a long time, Colonel Khaddafi’s Community of Sahelo-Saharan African States (CEN-SAD), were muchbetter funded. Despite their fondness for the empty pomp and circumstance of their ritual annual summits, manyof the continent’s rulers have been reluctant to pick the tab for running the organisation. As the role of the AU inregional peace and security has grown in the last two decades, much of its appropriations have come from non-African countries in Europe and North America, all too happy to outsource potential African military anddiplomatic crises. The AU has been equally happy to take the money.The AU began to look for solutions to this untenable position in 2001. Ten years later, in 2011, Nigeria’s formerruler, Olusegun Obasanjo was invited to lead a review into AU’s funding. After receiving his report, a retreat ofAfrica’s Presidents and Foreign Ministers in Kigali, capital of Rwanda, on 16 July 2016 agreed “to conduct astudy on the institutional reform of the African Union (AU).” Two days later, the AU Summit meeting in Kigalirequested Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, to lead the study and “report on the proposed reforms and thusput in place a system of governance capable of addressing the challenges facing the Union.” PresidentKagame’s report will be on the agenda at the Addis Ababa summit.1/3A crisis of institutional successionAlso in Kigali, the AU was supposed to have elected a successor to the disappointing tenure of the Chairpersonof its Commission – as the AU Secretariat is now called – South Africa’s Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. It couldbe said that much of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure, sadly, was spent in pursuit of her undisguised ambitions tosucceed to South Africa’s Presidency. The credentials of the candidates on parade to replace her in Kigali wereindifferent. Faced with this line up of choice without change, the Kigali summit decided to delay elections by sixmonths.Four months later, however, well into his stride on the brief to reform the AU, President Kagame reportedlyrequested the AU to defer the elections pending the completion and consideration of his report. If hisrecommendations are adopted, it is argued, they may redefine the structures, processes and personspecifications for the job. Many of his peers, however, are already fully invested in the campaign to replace DrDlamini-Zuma. Botswana, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya and Senegal have put forward candidates. TheirPresidents and their envoys are criss-crossing the continent, negotiating bargains and grubbing for votes. Few ofthem seem prepared to suspend their ambitions for continental conquest until President Kagame’s reformproposals are disclosed.The outcome of the Addis-Ababa Summit will hinge on the somewhat procedural issue of what takesprecedence: consideration of Kagame’s reform proposals or the elections to the AU Commission. If the Headssettle for the former, the likelihood will be a hold-over Commission, possibly with Kenya’s Erastus Mwencha, thecurrent Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, at the helm in acting capacity. This may not be entirelyunacceptable to Kenya which has run an energetic campaign on behalf of its candidate. If not, then the Summitwill be consumed by election fever. Either way, few will mourn the exit of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma.A crisis for regional diplomacy and governanceWhether the elections take place or not may hinge on and determine the outcome of Morocco’s application torejoin the continental body that it left in 1984, following the recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic(SADR). As an implicit condition for its re-admission, the King of Morocco has personally waged a full-courtpress garnished with ostentatious Royal generosity, asking African countries to throw the SADR out of thecontinental body. The historical claims of the SADR are well founded in the Charter of the United Nations and theConstitutive Act of the African Union, as well as judicial opinions of the International Court of Justice and theEuropean Court of Human Rights, among others.To achieve its goals, Morocco needs the votes of two-thirds or 36 member States of the AU, the same numberneeded to install a new Chair of the Commission. At the Kigali Summit in July 2016, up to 28 countries (out of 54)appeared prepared to vote to exclude SADR from the body.The leaders who meet in Addis Ababa may need to be reminded that the first objective of the Organisation ofAfrican Unity (OAU), predecessor to the AU, was decolonisation. Morocco’s mission to annex the Saharawisubverts this. As a pre-condition for granting its application, the AU could easily require Morocco to renounce allclaims to the territory of the Saharawi. As a stop-gap measure, they could also refer the question of the legalstatus of the SADR to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights for a judicial opinion to govern thediplomatic and political decisions thereafter.The other issue is The Gambia. At the end of 2016, Gambia’s President, His Excellency, Sheikh ProfessorAlhajie Dr. Yahya Abdul-Aziz Awal Jemus Junkung Jammeh, Naasiru Deen Babili Mansa, (Colonel Retired),Commander-in-Chief of The Armed Forces and Chief Custodian of the Sacred Constitution of the Gambia – toafford him his full title – conceded after clearly losing a general election whose outcome he could notpredetermine (despite his best efforts). More than a week after his concession, however, Jammeh claimed non-existent powers to annul the election, requisition a fresh one, and sit tight in the interim. He then sent soldiers toransack the premises of the electoral commission, exile its leadership and has generally given regional leadersmediating this manufactured impasse the run-around.A “closed Summit”2/3Each of these issues on its own would be very weighty. Together, they add up to a very formidable menu for thesummiteers in Addis-Ababa. If the Summit agrees with the plan put forward by President Kagame, the ballot forthe AU Commission could be deferred. If not, then a vote will proceed. It is too early to predict the outcome butthe early indications are that Kenya’s Amina Mohammed and Senegal’s Abdoulaye Bathily could be ahead. Adark-horse cannot, however, be ruled out. Morocco, still not a member of the AU, is reportedly weighing in withdiplomatic savvy in favour of a candidate whom it considers more favourably disposed to its divisive designs.The outcome could hinge on the inclinations of Algeria and Nigeria, both strong supporters of the SADR. If bothremain implacable, a hung summit could ensue.Many are hoping for the Gambian issue to be resolved before the summit. Effectively, Mr. Jammeh has foisted aclassic unconstitutional regime on the country, contrary to the norms and standards of the AU. The Gambia isdue to inaugurate a new President on 19 January but it is unclear whether this will happen. If it does not, MrJammeh will become an issue for the Summit. Should this come to pass, many of his AU peers could lackfreedom of speech to tell Mr Jammeh what to do because they have also chosen to override  the will of theirpeople and the rules in their own constitutions.In the language of the AU, the summit will be “closed”, allowing only the accredited delegations and staff toparticipate in and witness its deliberations. What is clear is that it will give the current class of Africa’s Heads ofState a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape the organisation. It could mark a break with business-as-usual in the AU. But if they prove unwilling or unable to see the opportunities or to take them, few will bepersuaded to take the AU seriously thereafter. Chidi Odinkalu (@chidiodinkalu) chairs the Section on Public Interest and Development Law (SPIDEL) at theNigerian Bar and is a former Chairman of Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission and a LSE alumnus. The views expressed in this post are those of the author and in no way reflect those of the Africa at LSEblog or the London School of Economics and Political Science.3/3

Après Zuma: can the African Union save itself? #28thAUSummit

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