Antill, Peter D.

Smith, Jeremy C.

English

Cranfield CERES

Questions to answerStriking in the Dark? The British Army and theNew Strike Brigade ConceptPeter D Antill and Jeremy C SmithCentre for Defence AcquisitionCranfield UniversityDefence Academy of the United KingdomShrivenhamSN6 8LASDSR 2010 was criticised almost from the moment it was published for its lack ofstrategic direction and its failure to deal with the challenges facing British defenceand security policy.1 The Conservative Government elected in May 2015 wastherefore under pressure to come up with a document that was far more strategic inoutlook and was not focused purely on cost cutting, given the changes in theinternational environment over the preceding five years. A combined SDSR andNational Security Strategy (NSS) was published in November 2015 which containedwhat many considered to be some positive developments for British defence andsecurity. These included the funding of extra resources for combatting terrorism andfor addressing significant technological challenges, including the growing threat ofcyber warfare2; they also included a restructuring of the armed forces.2However, an analysis of SDSR 2015 and the Defence Fact Sheets that support themreveal that, when it comes to the restructuring of the British Army, there is little detailunderlying the broad statements of intent. The Army now has a force structure it candevelop around but what exactly is the desired 'end state'? As part of Joint Force2025, the Army is to 'recover' from the effects of fighting two long counterinsurgencyoperations and return to a more flexible, mobile stance. It will be able to contributearound 40,000 personnel to a divisional-level expeditionary force of around 50,000,but how is it supposed to rapidly deploy what will constitute virtually half its regularstrength? It is also supposed to be able to contribute up to 10,000 personnel tosmaller contingencies, including flood and emergency relief here in the UK. Fromwhich formations will these personnel be drawn? What will be the impact onreadiness levels? What can be done to boost the retention of quality personnel?3How will all this be affected by the continued difficulty the MOD has had in recruitingreserves, the target for which is now 35,000? Has there been a change of emphasisin their planned use?4A central component of the reorganisation is the formation of two new 'strike'brigades. Given that the number of brigades in both the Reaction Force andAdaptable Force (formed under the Army 2020 force structure) is staying the same(at eleven) it looks as if the two strike brigades will be formed by 'downgrading' oneof the armoured infantry brigades and 'upgrading' one of the infantry brigades, butwhat exactly does that mean and what support assets will they contain? No detailedorganisational charts have yet been published, and the only information availableabout them is that each will be a 'medium' brigade, have 5,000 personnel in threebattalions and be equipped with the Ajax AFV and an as yet undeterminedmechanised infantry vehicle (MIV). If an armoured infantry brigade is re-roled, whatwill happen to the armoured regiment? If the idea is rapid mobility, which combatsupport and combat service support assets will be included? Will the UK look againat acquiring the M777 155mm lightweight howitzer?5 Being such an unknownquantity, how can the strike brigade's transportation and logistics requirements begauged and planning begin?Under the plans for Army 2020, 589 Ajax vehicles (which are supposed to be aroundforty-two tons) were ordered, so as to equip three cavalry regiments (one for eacharmoured infantry brigade) and nine reconnaissance platoons (one for each of thethree armoured regiments and six armoured infantry battalions in the three armouredinfantry brigades). How will Ajax be distributed? If the total ordered doesn't increase,how will the fleet be managed so that the fourth brigade is covered? If the numbersdo not increase, it might just be possible to equip four cavalry regiments (one foreach of the strike and armoured infantry brigades) as well as thereconnaissance platoons within the armoured regiments and armoured infantrybattalions, with a bit of creative whole fleet management or limiting access to onlythose units that are actually deploying.There is no detail on the mechanised infantry vehicle (MIV), only that it was originallyintended to replace the Mastiff and Ridgeback MRAP vehicles and is likely to be awheeled 8x8 MRAP-style vehicle. The exact roles both Ajax and the new MIV areintended to fulfil, and what that means doctrinally, needs to be clarified. What will theimpact be on sustainment, air-land integration and force readiness? What is theprocurement timeframe of the new MIV and how will it interact with Ajax andChallenger II?6Such questions need to be answered quickly, if the British Army is to reorganiseitself and move forward under the plans for Joint Force 2025.1 House of Commons Defence Committee. (2014) Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One,Volume I, HC 197 [Incorporating HC 1090-I, Session 2012-13], London: The Stationery Office Ltd, 7 January2014, located at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/197/197.pdf as of 19May 2016, p. 3.2 Ito, Pete and Antill, Peter. ‘Assessing What Matters' in Defence Procurement International, Winter 2015-16,pp. 12-17.3 Quentin, P. (2015) 'Endorsement, Not Investments: The British Army in the 2015 SDSR', RUSI Commentary,27 November 2015, located at https://rusi.org/commentary/endorsements-not-investments-british-army-2015-sdsr, as of 20 May 2016.4 BBC News. (2014) 'Armed Forces Plans Criticised as Reservist Recruitment Stalls', BBC News website, posted13 November 2014, located at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30033506, as of 20 May 2016; Think Defence.(2015) 'All Change for the Army Reserve', on Think Defence website, posted 25 February 2015, located athttp://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/02/all-change-for-the-army-reserve/, as of 20 May 2016.5 Ministry of Defence (MOD). (2008) Future Land Operating Concept 2008, DCDC, October 2008, p. 2-10.Gabriele. (2015) 'After the SDSR – Strike Brigades: A Big Deal?', UK Armed Forces Commentary website, lastupdated 2 December 2015, located at http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2015/11/after-sdsr-strike-brigades-big-deal.html, as of 20 May 2016.6 Op Cit. Quentin (2015); Clark, M. (2016) 'Strike Unsure? Clarifying the Role of Armour in Joint Force 2015'in RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 18, posted 22 April 2016 at www.rusi.org, as of 20 May 2016.

Questions to answer: Striking in the dark? The British Army and the new Strike Brigade concept

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Questions to answer: Striking in the dark? The British Army and the new Strike Brigade concept

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