DOI: 10.5564/mjia.v0i14.21Mongolian Journal of International Affairs No.14 2007 pp.37-4

Umebayashi, Hiromichi

English

Mongolia Journals Online

37Number 14, 2007The Mongolian Journal of International AffairsA Draft Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty:A Basis for DiscussionBy Hiromichi Umebayashi (Japan)First of all, I would like to express my deepest thanks to hostorganizations of this great conference for giving me a preciousopportunity to be here in Mongolia and speak on the topic ofvital importance of the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone(NEA-NWFZ). It is my special honor and pleasure to talk on this topicin Mongolia, a sole internationally recognized single state NWFZ. Inthis respect, my gratitude goes to all the Mongolian participants,especially friends from Blue Banner, including Ambassador Enkhsaikhan,the key organizer of this conference.Situation after the DPRK Nuclear TestBefore entering the details of my presentation, I want to mentionmy personal view briefly on the situation of the Six Party Talks on thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula after the 2006 October nucleartest by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The nuclearexplosion test by the DPRK was a serious setback for the regional peaceand security, but the 3rd session of the 5th Six Party Talks, which startedon February 8th 2007, restored the lost path leading to thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as it agreed to the initial actionsto implement the Joint Statement of September 19th 2005. This historicJoint Statement states “The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that thegoal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula in a peaceful manner,” and “The DPRK committed toabandoning all nuclear programs and returning at an early date to theNPT and to the IAEA safeguards.” Also the Joint Statement confirmed38The Mongolian Journal of International AffairsNumber 14, 2007that “The 1992 joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Koreanpeninsula should be observed and implemented.” Therefore, despite theprogress of the initial actions has been very slow since because of theunexpected hardships in the handling of the DPRK’s fund frozen in BancoDelta Asia, we can say we are now on the right track.Another point to be emphasized at this point is that it is all themore imperative that nuclear threats from any country should equallyeliminated and confidence of freedom from the nuclear threats areimpartially shared by all parties in this region. Recent developments, inwhich some observers in Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK) arguedfor the possible nuclear armament of Japan and the ROK, have clearlydemonstrated the necessity that the notion of the national security restingon the nuclear arms must be universally prohibited in this region. Namely,it is high time for us to pursue the way toward a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ).The Three-Plus-Three ArrangementPlease take a look at the chronology table on the last page of mypaper. After the Cold War, a Northeast Asia NWFZ became more thana political slogan. Several concrete proposals appeared as you see in thetable. We have already listened to the two speakers who are pioneers inthese efforts: Mr. Bernard Gourley from Professor Endicott’s group,and Professor Kumao Kaneko presented his views including hispioneering works. Learning these efforts and lessons, we proposed aso-called “three-plus-three” arrangement of a NEA-NWFZ in 1996 asa feasible and attainable approach. Eventually we proposed a ModelTreaty based on this arrangement at a workshop in the UN Headquartersin New York, in cooperation with the ROK NGOs, with guestcommentators including Prof. Kaneko in 2004.When we introduced the three-plus-three arrangement for the firsttime, there existed no Six Party Talk yet on the denuclearization of theKorean Peninsula. But we believed that in contemplating the situationin Northeast Asia, this approach would be most realistic because itrecognizes the fundamental composition of the nations involved; namelythe DPRK, the ROK and Japan could take on the leading role inestablishing a geographical nuclear weapon-free zone, and the U.S.,Russia and China could support these countries as nuclear-weapon states39Number 14, 2007The Mongolian Journal of International Affairswith strong security interests in the region. It is no accident that thesesix nations became the members of the later Six Party Talks.One of the merits with the three-plus-three arrangement is the threenon-nuclear weapon states can base their participation on their presentdeclared policies. In other words, the DPRK and the ROK can build onthe foundation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of theKorean Peninsula, which went into effect in 1992. The validity of theDeclaration was reaffirmed in February 2007, as I explained before. Onthe part of Japan, it has its three non-nuclear principles (no production,no possession, and no introduction of nuclear weapons) and its AtomicEnergy Basic Law prohibiting the military use of atomic energy (1955).These could easily be extended to support a nuclear weapon-free zone.A Model TreatyThe Model Treaty is by no means a finished document, but a basisfor further discussions and deliberations. The full text can be read at thefollowing URL.http://www.peacedepot.org/e-news/workingpaper1.pdf. I want to explain some of its features and remaining issues.(1) Six-Nation TreatyThe treaty would be signed by six nations with a three plus threestructure. The parties to the Treaty would be placed in two categories:“Intrazonal States” (Japan, DPRK, ROK) and “Neighboring NuclearWeapon States” (China, Russia, U.S.). Geographically, the NEA-NWFZis composed of the territory of the former category of States. The twocategories of states parties have different fundamental obligations underthe treaty.2) Obligations of the Intrazonal StatesIn addition to obligations common to the existing NWFZ treaties,such as the prohibition of development, test, production or possessionof nuclear weapons, the Model Treaty has introduced two uniqueobligations: “To eliminate all dependence whatsoever on any nuclearweapon or any other nuclear explosive device in all aspects of its securitypolicy,” and “To exert effort for the diffusion of education worldwidewith regard to the urgency of nuclear disarmament, including thetransmission to the present and future generations of the facts on thedamage inflicted on the citizens and cities by the atomic bombs dropped40The Mongolian Journal of International AffairsNumber 14, 2007in 1945.” The former is a progressive challenge and will be discussedmore in my separate presentation in the afternoon session. The latter isreflecting the regional characteristic of the northeast Asia that is theonly region of the entire world where nuclear weapons have been usedin reality. In light of the fact that the Intrazonal States are home tomany A-bomb survivors, the treaty includes this obligation to educatecoming generations regarding nuclear disarmament and the damage tohumans and societies inflicted by nuclear weapons.(3) Obligations of the Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States —Security Assurances Built into the Treaty BodyExisting nuclear weapon-free zone treaties include negative securityassurance, the assurance for nuclear weapon states not to use or threatento use such weapons against non-nuclear states within the Zone, asclauses in the protocol. In contrast, in the Model Treaty, they areincorporated as requirements of the treaty itself because the NeighboringNuclear Weapon States are closely involved in the regional security andthe security assurances are considered to be one of the central concernsto be addressed in a NEA-NWFZ treaty.(4) Prior Consultation Arrangement for Transits or Calls of Shipsand PlanesAll the existing NWFZ treaties leave the problem of ships or planessuspected of carrying nuclear weapons entering ports or passing throughsea or air territory up to the individual parties directly involved.Considering past protracted controversies on this subject, the ModelTreaty takes example by existing treaties, but takes it a step further andincorporates an obligation of prior consultation in all such situations inadvance. Permission or denial of permission resulting from suchconsultation is left up to the states parties involved, which should act incompliance with the spirit of the Treaty. This arrangement follows thecurrent practice that the successive administrations of Japan claim tohave been taking up in relation to Japan’s non-nuclear three principles.(5) Obligation to Cooperate with EnergyThe 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula prohibits the possession of “nuclear reprocessing and uraniumenrichment facilities.” Many observers agree that application of such a41Number 14, 2007The Mongolian Journal of International Affairsprohibition to Japan would make it almost impossible to conclude thetreaty at an early date because it has already invested for such activitiesfor a long time as its national endeavor. However, the treaty mightperpetuate an obvious imbalance between Japan and the Koreas withrespect to securing energy unless some due consideration is takenregionally or internationally. The Model Treaty recognizes theimportance of this problem and establishes the following obligation. “TheIntrazonal States shall pursue and develop cooperation among themselvesin good faith to secure stable and sustainable energy for each of theIntrazonal States.”(6) Some Remaining IssuesAs I said earlier, the Model Treaty is a point of departure for furtherdiscussion and deliberations. However, in giving shape to such a treaty,several important unresolved issues have been demonstrated.One major problem is an embodiment of verification system. Theverification system must fully utilize the capabilities of the IAEA. Inaddition, we should develop a regional verification system in a way thatbuilds trust and cooperation among the nations of the region. The recentlyagreed Central Asia NWFZ Treaty (Semipalatinsk Treaty) has becomethe first treaty that adopts the provision to oblige state parties to concludewith IAEA and bring into force not only full-scope safeguards but alsoan Additional Protocol. Our model treaty follows suite to this example.Nevertheless it is good idea to develop additional regional system tocomplement international arrangement.Another important issue is energy cooperation, and here we mustbe content with initiating a wide-ranging discussion. Formulating anagreement will take time and many obstacles must be overcome. I believethe deliberation on the problem is closely related to the internationalcontrol of the nuclear fuel cycle that draws much attention recently.Also, the matter of ships and aircraft suspected of carrying nuclearweapons will clearly require deeper discussion and experiential exchangewithin concerned researchers and citizens.Although these issues and others are open for more deliberation, Iwould like to emphasize that rapid establishment of even a minimalNortheast Asia NWFZ will contribute greatly to peace and stability inthe region. In this context, I believe that the No.5 Working Group forNortheast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism set up in initial actions42The Mongolian Journal of International AffairsNumber 14, 2007agreement at the Six Party Talk in February 2007 can be a reasonablevenue to start negotiations for a NEA-NWFZ.Table 1.  CHRONOLGYProposals for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free ZoneMarch 1995 Endicott, et al. Limited N uclear Weapon-Free Zone (LN WFZ) applicable to non-strategic nuclear weapon only. C ircular LN WFZ consisting of a circular area with a 2000-kilometer radius from a center point at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula.  Later, Elliptic LN WFZ with its major axis extending to part of Alaska 1995 Andrew Mack N WFZ involving the RO K, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan March 1996 Kumao Kaneko C ircular N WFZ consisting of a circular area with a 2000-kilometer radius from a center point at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. O bligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states within the zone would differ from each other. May 1996 H iromichi Umebayashi Three Plus Three Arrangement involving three non-nuclear weapon states (RO K, DPRK, Japan) and three nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, US) O ctober 1997 Endicott, et al. LN WFZ involving non-nuclear weapon states (the RO K, Japan and Mongolia (DPRK) ) as a Phase I  April 2004 H iromichi Umebayashi, et al. Model Treaty of Three Plus Three Arrangement 

A Draft Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty: A Basis for Discussion

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A Draft Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty: A Basis for Discussion

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