Krisch, Nico

English

<intR>²Dok

COVID, Crisis and Change in GlobalGovernanceNico Krisch 2020-04-17T18:01:23Crises facilitate change: they remove obstacles which, in normal times, favour thestatus quo. Crises often strengthen existing trends which may have been sloweddown by institutional inertia or political resistance. An event of the magnitude ofthe COVID-19 crisis is likely to have serious consequences in domestic as well asinternational politics. What will it mean for global governance? Which tendencies is itgoing to reinforce, which ones will it weaken?Little on this can be said with any certainty, especially because much depends onevents impossible to predict – events related directly to the crisis (how long will thecrisis last where, how strongly will it affect which countries?) but also others (will XiJinping’s position remain strong, will Donald Trump be reelected in November?).Yet even if what follows involves an element of speculation, likely scenarios appearrather gloomy. Six conjectures:Resource crunchOne of the most immediate consequences of the crisis will be a sudden rise in thelevel of public debt, due to the economic rescue and stimulus programmes countriesare scrambling to put together, worth billions, even trillions of dollars or euros. Inthe years to come, governments will have to service an enormous debt burden – ontop of the burden many still carry as a result of the financial crisis a decade ago (orfrom before). Once the immediate crisis with its exceptional turn to the state is over,many governments will enjoy little financial marge de manoeuvre and their attentionis likely to stay inwards rather than outwards. International organizations, alreadysubject to underfunding, will have to make do with yet more limited means – at atime when many more countries, especially in the Global South, will need help.Anti-internationalismEven if they disagree about the length and depth of it, economists agree thata recession is coming, and probably a deep one with a substantial rise inunemployment. In the past decade, frustrations from economic downturns haveoften found expression in populist politics – typically right-wing populism with a gooddose of anti-internationalism and xenophobia. If we see more of it as a result of thecurrent crisis, we should expect yet greater contestation of international institutions– of international institutions in general, but especially those defending access forforeigners, such as the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) or the EuropeanUnion (EU) among its member states. Organizations protecting free trade, suchas the World Trade Organization (WTO), may well face a stronger backlash, too, if- 1 -governments turn to protectionist means to strengthen their economies and mightunclench a downward spiral on global trade (though whether this will indeed happenis less sure). And, yes, the World Health Organization (WHO) is already under attack– international institutions are also easy scapegoats for domestic troubles.   From West to EastFor some time, China has been gaining ground in world politics and internationalinstitutions, driven by its own economic strength and the retreat of the US. This trendis likely to be reinforced (even if we were to see a more internationally engaging USadministration in the coming year) as China is set on making a quicker recovery fromthe crisis than Europe and the US. Its economy is so globalized that it will still take asignificant hit, but probably a more limited one than other economic centers. Globalefforts at dealing with the crisis – through the international financial institutions aswell as development organizations – will thus depend yet more than in the past onChinese engagement, which will require giving China a greater say than Westerncountries have been prepared to accept in the past.Towards stagnation and informalitySince the millennium, the creation of new international organizations and theconclusion of new treaties on important issues have stagnated. This trend is likelyto deepen further as a result of the tendencies described above. Less funding andnationalist backlash will limit what existing institutions can do, and they are likely toundermine efforts at stronger international cooperation. Great-power competitionis also likely to lead to stalemate, as has already been visible in the UN SecurityCouncil’s approach to the COVID-19 crisis. As China demands greater influence andthe US seeks to protect its own position, gridlock is a likely outcome. New initiativesfor cooperation on specific issues, where they are successful, will then probablywork through smaller groups of states, and through informal mechanisms rather thanformal organizations or treaties – strengthening a trend visible for some time.      A less liberal orderHowever ‘liberal’ the current structure of global governance is, it is likely to becomeless so. This is not only because of an Eastward turn – democratic governancehas been under challenge for some time across the globe and the turn towardsgreater authoritarianism is bound to get a boost from the typical desire for strong,populist rulers in the midst of a crisis. Many of them are also adept at using the crisisto extend their powers and turn away from constitutionalist protections and liberalrights, as we currently see in Hungary and elsewhere. Human rights and democracy-promotion will come under yet greater strain than they already were at the UN, butalso in institutions in Europe and the Americas.- 2 -From public to privateEver since the turn to economic liberalization and globalizing markets, the weightof the state relative to private actors has declined in many countries, with importantconsequences for international institutions in terms of funding and structure (thinkonly of the shift to public-private institutions in global health, such as the Global Fundor GAVI). This decline is likely to be accentuated as a result of the crisis. Needless tosay, many private businesses suffer heavily from the downturn in economic activityas a result of measures to stop the spread of the virus. Yet some, especially techfirms, are flourishing. Those businesses emerging from the crisis – especially thebigger ones, rescued as they are too big to fail – may find themselves strengthenedby the weaker competition from other, smaller, originally less profitable firms. Withstates’ capacity crippled because of their debt, this may shift the balance yet furtherfrom public to private and push state-driven international organizations towards thesidelines.These six trends may eventually be more or less pronounced, but combined theyadd up to a dangerous mix for the current structure of global governance. Crises aremoments of opening and opportunity, yet they can lead us into any direction – theycan help to create but also to destroy institutions, and today’s circumstances seemto drive countries apart and undermine the structures of international cooperationwe know. And this at a time when in order to tackle the problems that lie ahead– from health to climate change and sustainable development – the world wouldneed stronger and better institutions of global governance: institutions with theindependence and resources to address these problems effectively, and withaccountability mechanisms that keep them committed to the pursuit of the publicgood. As global governance is itself at risk from the COVID-19 crisis, we need now,more than ever, coalitions of like-minded actors – public and private, from West andEast and North and South – to bring us from a path of stagnation and erosion ontoone of construction and hope.This article has also been published on "the global".- 3 -

COVID, Crisis and Change in Global Governance

https://intr2dok.vifa-recht.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/mir_derivate_00008290/COVID_Crisis_and_Change_in_Global_Governance.pdf

COVID, Crisis and Change in Global Governance

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

<intR>²Dok