Numerous studies and anecdotes demonstrate the "wisdom of the crowd," the
surprising accuracy of a group's aggregated judgments. Less is known, however,
about the generality of crowd wisdom. For example, are crowds wise even if
their members have systematic judgmental biases, or can influence each other
before members render their judgments? If so, are there situations in which we
can expect a crowd to be less accurate than skilled individuals? We provide a
precise but general definition of crowd wisdom: A crowd is wise if a linear
aggregate, for example a mean, of its members' judgments is closer to the
target value than a randomly, but not necessarily uniformly, sampled member of
the crowd. Building on this definition, we develop a theoretical framework for
examining, a priori, when and to what degree a crowd will be wise. We
systematically investigate the boundary conditions for crowd wisdom within this
framework and determine conditions under which the accuracy advantage for
crowds is maximized. Our results demonstrate that crowd wisdom is highly
robust: Even if judgments are biased and correlated, one would need to nearly
deterministically select only a highly skilled judge before an individual's
judgment could be expected to be more accurate than a simple averaging of the
crowd. Our results also provide an accuracy rationale behind the need for
diversity of judgments among group members. Contrary to folk explanations of
crowd wisdom which hold that judgments should ideally be independent so that
errors cancel out, we find that crowd wisdom is maximized when judgments
systematically differ as much as possible. We re-analyze data from two
published studies that confirm our theoretical results