Might a nuclear-armed terrorist group or state use ordinary commerce to
deliver a nuclear weapon by smuggling it in a cargo container or vehicle? This
delivery method would be the only one available to a sub-state actor, and it
might enable a state to make an unattributed attack. Detection of a weapon or
fissile material smuggled in this manner is difficult because of the large
volume and mass available for shielding. Here I review methods for screening
cargo containers to detect the possible presence of nuclear threats. Because of
the large volume of innocent international commerce, and the cost and
disruption of secondary screening by opening and inspection, it is essential
that the method be rapid and have a low false-positive rate. Shielding can
prevent the detection of neutrons emitted spontaneously or by induced fission.
The two promising methods are muon tomography and high energy X-radiography. If
they do not detect a shielded threat object they can detect the shield itself.Comment: 22 pp., 8 figs. APS Short Course on Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st
Centur