A key question that arises in rigorous analysis of cyberphysical systems
under attack involves establishing whether or not the attacked system deviates
significantly from the ideal allowed behavior. This is the problem of deciding
whether or not the ideal system is an abstraction of the attacked system. A
quantitative variation of this question can capture how much the attacked
system deviates from the ideal. Thus, algorithms for deciding abstraction
relations can help measure the effect of attacks on cyberphysical systems and
to develop attack detection strategies. In this paper, we present a decision
procedure for proving that one nonlinear dynamical system is a quantitative
abstraction of another. Directly computing the reach sets of these nonlinear
systems are undecidable in general and reach set over-approximations do not
give a direct way for proving abstraction. Our procedure uses (possibly
inaccurate) numerical simulations and a model annotation to compute tight
approximations of the observable behaviors of the system and then uses these
approximations to decide on abstraction. We show that the procedure is sound
and that it is guaranteed to terminate under reasonable robustness assumptions