This paper describes a complex networks approach to study the failure
tolerance of mechatronic software systems under various types of hardware
and/or software failures. We produce synthetic system architectures based on
evidence of modular and hierarchical modular product architectures and known
motifs for the interconnection of physical components to software. The system
architectures are then subject to various forms of attack. The attacks simulate
failure of critical hardware or software. Four types of attack are
investigated: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality
and random attack. Failure tolerance of the system is measured by a 'robustness
coefficient', a topological 'size' metric of the connectedness of the attacked
network. We find that the betweenness centrality attack results in the most
significant reduction in the robustness coefficient, confirming betweenness
centrality, rather than the number of connections (i.e. degree), as the most
conservative metric of component importance. A counter-intuitive finding is
that "designed" system architectures, including a bus, ring, and star
architecture, are not significantly more failure-tolerant than interconnections
with no prescribed architecture, that is, a random architecture. Our research
provides a data-driven approach to engineer the architecture of mechatronic
software systems for failure tolerance.Comment: Proceedings of the 2013 ASME International Design Engineering
Technical Conferences & Computers and Information in Engineering Conference
IDETC/CIE 2013 August 4-7, 2013, Portland, Oregon, USA (In Print