Cuing and Coordination in American Elections #

Abstract

Cuing and Coordination in American Elections I use evolutionary game models based on pure imitation to reexamine recent findings that strategic coordination characterizes the American electorate. Imitation means that voters who are dissatisfied with their strategy adopt the strategy of the first voter they encounter who is similar to them. In the replicator dynamics such imitation implies, everyone ultimately uses the coordinating strategy, but I study what happens over time spans that are relevant for voters. I consider three evolutionary models, including two that involve partisan cuing. Simulations using National Election Studies data from presidential years 1976--96 suggest that many voters use an unconditional strategy, usually a strategy of voting a straight ticket matching their party identification. I then estimate a choice model that incorporates an approximation to the evolutionary dynamics. The results support partisan cuing and confirm that most voters vote unconditionally. The estimates also support previous findings regarding policy moderation and institutional balancing