There aretwodiscoursesconcerning human rights: contractual and un-contractual. Equality of law and equality before lawis based onthe equality of the deserving; but, in un-contractual discourse, the equality of the deserving isan objective thing and rooted in comprehensive and unit truth. On the other hand, in contractualdiscourse, the equality of the deserving is obtained with credibility. Apparently, theory of human typical (generic) multiplicity isn’t consistent with theory of the equality of the deserving. The main question in this paper is: In un-contractual discourse how can we speak of social equity while we accept Multiplicity of type? This research achievement is that according to Mulla Sadra's philosophy we can present two models of the interpretation of the principle of equality: "objective equality in equivocal thing (or typical unity)" and "objective equality in the non-unequivocal thing". And considering that these two models are objective ones in the philosophy of Mulla Sadra and preferring those models to subjective and contractual one, we do not need to plan subjective model in philosophy of Mulla Sadra. Model "objective equality in the non-unequivocal thing" in the interpretation of the principle of equality is one of the innovations ofthisenquiry
