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Boosting the precision of virtual call integrity protection with partial pointer analysis for C++
Authors
X Fan
X Liao
Y Sui
J Xue
Publication date
10 July 2017
Publisher
'Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)'
Doi
Cite
Abstract
© 2017 Association for Computing Machinery. We present, Vip, an approach to boosting the precision of Virtual call Integrity Protection for large-scale real-world C++ programs (e.g., Chrome) by using pointer analysis for the first time. Vip introduces two new techniques: (1) a sound and scalable partial pointer analysis for discovering statically the sets of legitimate targets at virtual callsites from separately compiled C++ modules and (2) a lightweight instrumentation technique for performing (virtual call) integrity checks at runtime. Vip raises the bar against vtable hijacking attacks by providing stronger security guarantees than the CHA-based approach with comparable performance overhead. Vip is implemented in LLVM-3.8.0 and evaluated using SPEC programs and Chrome. Statically, Vip protects virtual calls more effectively than CHA by significantly reducing the sets of legitimate targets permitted at 20.3% of the virtual callsites per program, on average. Dynamically, Vip incurs an average (maximum) instrumentation overhead of 0.7% (3.3%), making it practically deployable as part of a compiler tool chain
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Last time updated on 18/10/2019