Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation

Abstract

16 pages, 14 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 89.65.−s, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0806.1649Spatial structure is known to have an impact on the evolution of cooperation, and so it has been intensively studied during recent years. Previous work has shown the relevance of some features, such as the synchronicity of the updating, the clustering of the network, or the influence of the update rule. This has been done, however, for concrete settings with particular games, networks, and update rules, with the consequence that some contradictions have arisen and a general understanding of these topics is missing in the broader context of the space of 2×2 games. To address this issue, we have performed a systematic and exhaustive simulation in the different degrees of freedom of the problem. In some cases, we generalize previous knowledge to the broader context of our study and explain the apparent contradictions. In other cases, however, our conclusions refute what seems to be established opinions in the field, as for example the robustness of the effect of spatial structure against changes in the update rule, or offer new insights into the subject, e.g., the relation between the intensity of selection and the asymmetry between the effects on games with mixed equilibria.This work is partially supported by Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Spain) under Grants Ingenio-MATHEMATICA and MOSAICO, and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under Grants SIMUMAT-CM and MOSSNOHO-CM.Publicad

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