Stackelberg routing platforms (SRP) reduce congestion in one-shot traffic
networks by proposing optimal route recommendations to selfish travelers.
Traditionally, Stackelberg routing is cast as a partial control problem where a
fraction of traveler flow complies with route recommendations, while the
remaining respond as selfish travelers. In this paper, a novel Stackelberg
routing framework is formulated where the agents exhibit \emph{probabilistic
compliance} by accepting SRP's route recommendations with a \emph{trust}
probability. A greedy \emph{\textbf{T}rust-\textbf{A}ware \textbf{S}tackelberg
\textbf{R}outing} algorithm (in short, TASR) is proposed for SRP to compute
unique path recommendations to each traveler flow with a unique demand.
Simulation experiments are designed with random travel demands with diverse
trust values on real road networks such as Sioux Falls, Chicago Sketch, and
Sydney networks for both single-commodity and multi-commodity flows. The
performance of TASR is compared with state-of-the-art Stackelberg routing
methods in terms of traffic congestion and trust dynamics over repeated
interaction between the SRP and the travelers. Results show that TASR improves
network congestion without causing a significant reduction in trust towards the
SRP, when compared to most well-known Stackelberg routing strategies