Najdi, Watfa

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69FMR 7069Social cohesion in refugee-hosting contextsas a Humanitarian Objective’ project4 has identified various strategies to encourage more welcoming attitudes towards Syrians in Lebanon. Some programmes that were originally designed to provide aid solely to refugees have incorporated Lebanese beneficiaries. Other programmes have created spaces for positive interaction between hosts and displaced Syrians, in the hope of building social connections and trust. These have been led by NGOs and international organisations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Stability in Lebanon is hardly threatened by the large number of Syrians it hosts, as many have long-established social ties and kinship in the country. Exclusion and hostility across sects have been a steadfast part of Lebanon’s short history as a nation-state. Its response to displaced people, including Armenians, Palestinians, Iraqis and now Syrians, has been marked by discrimination. However, solidarity and support for displaced Syrians relies heavily on the role of civil society. Many of the most successful initiatives have been collaborations between Syrian and Lebanese actors. Two NGOs, Multi Aid Programs and Basmeh & Zeitooneh, for example, were founded by upper- and middle-class Syrians and were offered significant start-up support by members of Lebanon’s civil society. The often closely related and intertwined Syrian and Lebanese civil society actors share the same goals; maintaining stability in the country that has provided asylum to so many displaced Syrians. Civil society is fundamental to the aims of the ‘stability sector’ in Lebanon.  Dawn Chatty dawn.chatty@qeh.ox.ac.uk @nouraddouha Emeritus Professor of Anthropology and Forced Migration, University of Oxford1. For historical background see Fawaz L (1992) An Occasion for War: Civil conflict in Lebanon and Damascus 1860, Berkeley: University of California Press2. Dionigi F (2017) ‘Rethinking borders: The dynamics of Syrian Displace to Lebanon’, Middle East Law and Governance, Vol 9 (3): 232-2483. Chatty D (2017) ‘How Syrian Refugees Survive’, Current History, Vol 116 (794):337-3414. bit.ly/social-cohesion-sochoAid tensions after the 2020 Beirut port explosionWatfa Najdi Tensions can intensify in contexts of overlapping crises: humanitarian actors must recognise the different kinds of tension resulting from aid distribution and respond accordingly.In August 2020, a massive explosion tore through north-eastern Beirut, damaging tens of thousands of homes and buildings. As humanitarian assistance poured into the affected neighbourhoods, there was widespread public scrutiny about how aid was targeted and distributed. Amidst a broader context of financial, political and health crises, state and humanitarian actors became increasingly concerned about inter-communal tensions.The experience of tension in Bourj HammoudAccording to Tension Monitoring Surveys administered by UNDP, social tensions intensified following the explosion, especially between Lebanese nationals and Syrian refugees, both of whom experienced heightened socio-economic vulnerability. Both groups felt that aid had been unfairly distributed. Paradoxically, many Syrians felt discriminated against by providers of assistance, while many Lebanese complained that Syrians received an undue portion of aid.  While ‘tensions’ are extensively monitored in Lebanon, there has been limited ethnographic research on the experience of tension or its complex relationship with various forms of identity, such as sect, nationality, or class. To explore this issue from an ethnographic lens, I initiated a participatory research project in June 2021 with 9 residents of Bourj Hammoud, a FMR 7070 Social cohesion in refugee-hosting contextsrefugee- and migrant-hosting neighbourhood affected by the blast. Bourj Hammoud was established in the early 1900s as a place of refuge for Armenians displaced by the genocidal campaigns conducted by the Ottoman empire. It now accommodates diverse low-income groups including Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi refugees as well as migrant workers from Africa and Asia. Although the neighbourhood offers employment opportunities and relatively affordable housing, it is identified as a poor area predominantly inhabited by refugees, with crumbling infrastructure and inadequate urban services.1Perceptions of unfair aid distributionReflecting on the aftermath of the Beirut blast, research participants recalled accusations and resentment across lines of nationality and legal status. One Lebanese contributor explained that “Lebanese citizens were angry and frustrated that Syrian refugees were getting aid”. On the contrary, a Syrian contributor identified a false perception that aid was given to Syrians more than others. “Most assistance targeted Lebanese citizens only”, she added. Such stereotypes, often imposed on both citizens and foreign nationals, were used by certain individuals, media outlets and political actors. Not for the first time, rumours were woven into politicised aid narratives and circulated to aggravate anti-refugee sentiments towards Syrians and to push for their return. These perceptions of unfair aid distribution added to longer standing tensions within Bourj Hammoud, especially in regard to an area called Naba’a. Administratively, Naba’a falls within the Bourj Hammoud Municipality. However, this area is home to a high concentration of refugees and Shi’ite residents, who stand out within the predominantly Christian population of eastern Beirut. For this reason, some see Naba’a as existing ‘outside’ Bourj Hammoud, reflecting the importance of religion and nationality as a basis for exclusion. One contributor explained, “Bourj Hammoud is divided in terms of interactions… The quarters and the buildings are segregated according to people’s nationalities and religious beliefs”. This sense of spatial division and conflicting communal identities in Bourj Hammoud generates antipathy, particularly when it comes to divergent narratives about aid bias.  However, intercommunal divides between sects and nationalities – what is often called the horizontal dimension of most social cohesion frameworks – do not fully capture the image of ‘tension’ that emerged from this study. Much anger was directed at the institutions responsible for targeting and distributing aid – what is often called the vertical dimension. After the explosion, the army and various NGOs visited people’s houses to record the damage and provide financial assistance for repairs. According to our contributors, these assessments were uncoordinated and lacked clear criteria for targeting aid. Both Lebanese and non-Lebanese contributors described witnessing evidence of aid bias based on nationality. An Iraqi contributor explained that even though her apartment was more damaged than others in her building, the Lebanese Army gave her family 500,000 LBP, whereas all Lebanese families received 4,000,000 LBP. Meanwhile, a Lebanese contributor complained that Syrians can access more funding than Lebanese, despite the economic challenges faced by both groups. Conversely, a Syrian contributor wrote that her family was considered “ineligible to receive any financial assistance because as Syrians they should be getting aid from UNHCR”. Vertical or horizontal?To avoid exacerbating refugee-host tensions, these vertical (provider-beneficiary) dimensions must be recognised alongside horizontal (inter-communal) dimensions. However, despite the rise in tensions following the blast, there were no major incidents of physical violence between refugees and hosts. Our refugee contributors generally described Bourj Hammoud as a place of diversity and tolerance, where bonds have emerged through cooperative interactions and shared hardships. During our research, we heard numerous examples 71FMR 7071Social cohesion in refugee-hosting contextsof everyday cross-communal solidarity, such as borrowing money from a neighbour or offering support for a classmate after the loss of a relative. However, when anger is directed upwards to institutions – whether the state, local NGOs, or international actors – it risks being deflected laterally to neighbours. It is therefore crucial that aid actors recognise vertical tensions in their conflict sensitivity frameworks and respond to crises accordingly. This might involve working with state actors to introduce a more comprehensive social protection system2 as well as learning from and supporting existing solidarity mechanisms, which tend to provide a more contextualized and conflict-sensitive response3. Additionally, adopting more systematic and transparent targeting methods could help aid actors to address tensions resulting from perceptions of unfair aid distribution.Watfa Najdi wn17@aub.edu.lb @watfanajdi Project Coordinator and Researcher, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut1. UN-Habitat (2017) Nabaa Neighbourhood Profile: Bourj Hammoud, Beirut bit.ly/nabaa-profile2. Alijla, A (2022) ‘Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: Lebanon, Financial Crisis, COVID-19 Crisis, and the Social Protection System’, EuroMesco Policy Study N.24, European Institute of the Mediterranean3. Haddad, S, Aliaga L and Attree L (2018) ‘Building peace into refugee responses: Syrian refugees in Lebanon’, Saferworld and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS)  bit.ly/saferworld-Syrian-refugeesIncoherent policies and contradictory priorities in KenyaMichael OwisoSince 2013, Kenya has embraced contradictory policies to manage its refugee affairs, with simultaneous calls for encampment, socio-economic integration and camp closure that affect both refugees and host communities.Policies should aim to realise a people or a group’s aspirations. However, in politically complex institutional environments, the design and adoption of policies may lose sight of common goals. Since the 1990s, Kenya has enforced a strict policy of refugee encampment. Then in 2017, in an apparent turn towards integration, Kenya became a pilot roll-out country of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)1 and pledged to pursue self-reliance and socio-economic integration for refugees. The 2021 Refugees Act embraced both integration and encampment in a confusing combination of seemingly contradictory policy orientations.2 Further complicating the situation, the central government has made repeated calls to close the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, which host over 80% of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya. In light of these contradictions, how should we understand the Kenyan government’s commitments? How do these policies affect refugee-host relations? This article draws upon interviews and discussions with refugees and host community members in Kakuma, as well as aid providers, to describe the divergent policy space that has emerged.Incompatible policies: encampment, integration and camp closureBefore Kenya passed its first comprehensive refugee law in 2006, refugees were free to move, work and integrate into Kenyan society. This policy came under scrutiny in the 1990s, following the arrival of large numbers of refugees escaping war and famine in Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia. The Dadaab and Kakuma camps were created in northern Kenya during this influx. Kenya has since accommodated a rising number of refugees and asylum seekers through a strict encampment policy that limits movement, with restrictions particularly focused on Somali refugees.

Aid tensions after the 2020 Beirut port explosion

https://pure.eur.nl/files/133084725/Aid_tensions_after_the_2020_Beirut_port_explosion.pdf

Aid tensions after the 2020 Beirut port explosion

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