Truth and Reference: Some Doubts about Formal Semantics

Abstract

Formal semantics might be understood as the attempt to show that the most fruitful theories about a natural language are based upon a formalized specification of that language’s structure. Since it hopes to provide the basis for theories about language, formal semantics is obviously concerned with notions like grammaticality, reference, and meaning. Just as a system of formal logic attempts to give a formal account of our intuitions about the validity of informal arguments, so does the formalization of semantics attempt to systematize and make rigorous our intuitions about, for example, the grammaticality, significance, synonymy, reference, and truth value of certain expressions in a natural language. The ultimate aim of formal semantics might be thought of as constructing an account of meaning analogous to the logical account of validity, viz. one that would provide necessary and sufficient conditions for determining the meaning of any expression in the natural language, or portion of a natural language, that is being formalized

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