Kleptographic Attacks against Implicit Rejection

Abstract

Given its integral role in modern encryption systems such as CRYSTALS-Kyber, the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform will soon be at the center of our secure communications infrastructure. An enduring debate surrounding the FO transform is whether to use explicit or implicit rejection when decapsulation fails. Presently, implicit rejection, as implemented in CRYSTALS-Kyber, is supported by a strong set of arguments. Therefore, understanding its security implications in different attacker models is essential. In this work, we study implicit rejection through a novel lens, namely, from the perspective of kleptography. Concretely, we consider an attacker model in which the attacker can subvert the user\u27s code to compromise security while remaining undetectable. In this scenario, we present three attacks that significantly reduce the security level of the FO transform with implicit rejection. Notably, our attacks apply to CRYSTALS-Kyber