Since mid-2005, the Iranian regime has embarked on a course
of aggressive and public brinksmanship regarding its domestic
nuclear program. This article explores this new Iranian behavior
by first elucidating the range of strategic variables comprising
the Iranian nuclear equation and then evaluating how recent
evolutions in the international and domestic environments have
altered the influence of the equation’s different variables. The
analysis demonstrates that Iran’s recent brinksmanship gambit
was driven largely by the regime’s desire to use the nuclear issue
to garner domestic public support, and was enabled by the growing perceived inability of the international community to enact
effective coercive measures against Iran. The article culminates
with a recommendation that U.S. and EU policymakers seriously evaluate the hitherto dismissed alternative of accepting
nuclear fuel cycle facilities on Iranian soil under the control of a
multinational or international consortium. Emphasis is placed
on the importance of considering such alternatives before Iran
achieves nuclear technological independence