International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
Abstract
A secret-sharing scheme allows to distribute a secret s among n parties such that only some predefined ``authorized\u27\u27 sets of parties can reconstruct the secret, and all other ``unauthorized\u27\u27 sets learn nothing about s.
The collection of authorized/unauthorized sets can be captured by a monotone function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}.
In this paper, we focus on monotone functions that all their min-terms are sets of size a, and on their duals -- monotone functions whose max-terms are of size b. We refer to these classes as (a,n)-upslices and (b,n)-downslices, and note that these natural families correspond to monotone a-regular DNFs and monotone (n−b)-regular CNFs. We derive the following results.
1. (General downslices) Every downslice can be realized with total share size of 1.5n+o(n)<20.585n. Since every monotone function can be cheaply decomposed into n downslices, we obtain a similar result for general access structures improving the previously known 20.637n+o(n) complexity of Applebaum, Beimel, Nir and Peter (STOC 2020). We also achieve a minor improvement in the exponent of linear secrets sharing schemes.
2. (Random mixture of upslices) Following Beimel and Farras (TCC 2020) who studied the complexity of random DNFs with constant-size terms, we consider the following general distribution F over monotone DNFs: For each width value a∈[n], uniformly sample ka monotone terms of size a, where k=(k1,…,kn) is an arbitrary vector of non-negative integers. We show that, except with exponentially small probability, F can be realized with share size of 20.5n+o(n) and can be linearly realized with an exponent strictly smaller than 2/3. Our proof also provides a candidate distribution for ``exponentially-hard\u27\u27 access structure.
We use our results to explore connections between several seemingly unrelated questions about the complexity of secret-sharing schemes such as worst-case vs. average-case, linear vs. non-linear and primal vs. dual access structures. We prove that, in at least one of these settings, there is a significant gap in secret-sharing complexity