International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
Abstract
Concerns about declining stock and profitability in the Tasmanian rock
lobster industry led to the introduction of individual transferable quota
(ITQ) management in 1998. In this study, fisher groups were categorised
by effort and quota ownership traits to examine response to revised
management, and how profit drivers moderated this change. The number of
investors who are not active fishers has steadily grown with a
commensurate expansion of the lease quota market. The number of lease
dependent fishers has remained steady through time while quota owner
fishers have declined. In contrast to many other ITQ fisheries, the investor
group has not consolidated into a small number of entities and there is little
processor involvement. This was a result of fisheries rules explicitly
designed to retain benefits of diverse ownership though a cap on the
maximum allowed number of quota units per legal entity. Three categories
of active fishers participate in the lease trade. Quota-transferring fishers
lease quota both in and out, usually to secure access to quota at the start of
the season with surplus quota being leased off later. Large-scale, lease
quota dependent fishers have increased through time and are characterised
by high fishing effort and high annual turnover but low profit per unit of
fish. Small-scale lease quota dependent fishers utilise capital less fully and
have less capacity to survive in the long run. These small scale lease fishers
face barriers to entry into the large scale category through high upfront
capital investment costs, which could hamper industry renewal. Potential
issues for management that arise from lease-reliant fishers are (i) that their
higher financial stress increases compliance risk and (ii) their lack of
investment in quota assets reduces incentive for stewardship of the
resource
