This thesis uses primary and secondary sources to analyse the applicability of David Galula’s counterinsurgency theories as described in his 1964 work Contre-insurrection: théorie et pratique to three cases from the insurgent conflicts in postcolonial Uganda from 1981 to 2006. These conflicts include the National Resistance Army (NRA) in the Luwero Triangle from 1981 to 1986, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in northern Uganda and southern Sudan from the group’s founding in 1987 to its formal departure from Uganda in 2006, and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and United National Rescue Front (UNRF I&II) insurgencies in West Nile district between 1986 and 2002. These three cases offer examples of localised insurgent conflicts fought between national armed forces and regionally or ethnically motivated insurgent groups. This provides substantial evidence that Galula’s theories apply in contexts other than the international, expeditionary and/or colonial counterinsurgent campaigns to which his theories have previously been applied. It concludes that Galula’s theories offer both civilian and military leaders a model for counterinsurgency operations that they can readily apply. Galula’s theory stands up when scrutinised in the context of thirty years of conflict in which ethnic, regional, geographic, and religious factors affected the insurgencies, thereby showing its applicability across a wide range of potential insurgencies
