This study is designed to analyze potential solutions to the collective action problem. The collective action problem refers to the social dilemma that individuals face when deciding between short-term individual interests and long-term group goals. The assumption is that individual interests are likely to outweigh those of the group. Thus, in order to resolve the dilemma researchers are forced to seek out solutions that identify different factors that will entice the individual to sacrifice their short-term interest in favor of group goals. This study analyzed this question within the context of nationalist rebellion, and focused on three potential explanations. The first is the Relative Deprivation Model relying on the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis as the model of the individual. This explanation was found to be logically and empirically weak, and was hence dismissed as a useable explanation. The second explanation is the collective action model, which relies on a rational actor assumption of individual decision making. The third explanation is a modified relative deprivation theory, which relies on a prospect theory assumption of individual decision-making. Both of these explanations are logically sound, but they lack empirical evaluation. Therefore, the latter two models were subjected to empirical tests using evidence gathered from individuals in Northern Ireland and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The data gathered from individuals regarding their decision processes provided falsifying evidence for the collective action explanation, and provided confirming evidence for the modified relative deprivation model
