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research
Implementation of the Walrassian Correspondance by Market Games
Authors
Luis C. Corchón
Simon Wilkie
Publication date
1 January 1995
Publisher
Privietlab
Abstract
In this paper we present a set ofaxioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria aH coincide in the framework of market games
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