Ian Dearden, Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense? An inquiry into the possibility of illusions of meaning, Revised Edition, Rellet Press, 2013, 135 pp., ISBN-1-904408-10-

Torriani, Tristan G.

English

Akademicka Platforma Czasopism

Logic and Logical PhilosophyVolume 23 (2014), 365–368DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2014.007Book ReviewsIan Dearden, Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense? An inquiry into thepossibility of illusions of meaning, Revised Edition, Rellet Press, 2013,135 pp., ISBN-1-904408-10-9.Philosophy has been practised for thousands of years as a quest for ulti-mate truth. Only recently has meaning come to the fore as the centralphilosophical issue when it was recognized as a pre-condition for truth.Truth applies to propositions, but the concepts they invoke must bemeaningful even if they are devoid of a concrete reference. If conceptsare understood as classificatory skills, they may be considered meaning-ful insofar as they serve some cognitive purpose (Kant could have saidthey were zweckgemäß) and are thus normatively acceptable. Philosoph-ical disputes generally hinge on conceptual definitions and accusationsof spouting nonsense have become too commonplace after Wittgenstein.Ian Dearden’s book is a significant response to this abusive phenomenonhe calls Nonsensicalism.Let us suppose a semantic game in which a proponent (P) wants tointroduce a novel concept such as global citizenship, animal rights, orgay marriage. The nonsensicalist opponent’s (NO) response is to rejectthe proposal out of hand on grounds that the concepts in question aresimply nonsensical. Dearden develops a counterargument by accusingthe nonsensicalist of making an uncharitable assumption concerning theproponent’s capacity to assess the meaning of his or her conceptual pro-posal. Upon hearing P’s argument, NO may grant that the proposal ismeant seriously and sincerely, but condescendingly behaves as if P lackedcognitive competence to assess the relevance, coherence or truth of his orher own utterances. Dearden calls this kind of linguistic self-deceptionan illusion of meaning (IOM) and his book is devoted to a thoroughexamination of its possibility.Published online March 30, 2014© 2014 by Nicolaus Copernicus University366 Book ReviewsDearden’s book is divided into ten chapters. The first chapter is in-troductory and defines ’nonsensicalism’ and ’illusions of meaning’. Chap-ter Two examines Norman Malcolm’s book Dreaming as an example ofnonsensicalism in action. In particular, Dearden notes that Malcolmnot only tends to make meaning dependent upon verification (verifica-tionism), but also treats allegedly nonsensical statements as if they weremeaningful and logically articulated. Chapter Three expands upon thisand shows that when nonsensicalists are required to deal properly withnonsense it becomes much harder to demarcate between sense and non-sense and to attribute illusions of meaning to their opponents. ChapterFour seeks to show how nonsensicalists cannot avoid attributing illusionsof meaning to their interlocutors. Chapter Five addresses the issue ofhow alleged nonsense retains an appearance of meaningfulness. Thisand the absence of clear cut examples of nonsense indicate further dif-ficulties with nonsensicalism. Chapter Six discusses non-philosophicalcases of illusions of meaning. Chapter Seven deepens the analysis ofhow illusions of meaning are possible. If the content of an utterance isreally meaningless, then we could not tell what the speakers meant orwhether they were deceiving themselves in believing that what they saidmeant anything at all. Chapter Eight discusses Wittgenstein’s account ofphilosophical error and the absence of introspectible difference when wemean something. Since Wittgenstein denied that a speaker’s meaning isrelated to mental events and processes, meaningful speech and illusionsof meaning are harder to distinguish. Chapter Nine examines generalcriteria of meaningfulness as a possible ground for denying meaning toan utterance and finds them to be stipulative and arbitrary. ChapterTen concludes with a negative assessment of nonsensicalism. Deardenadvises those who would attribute illusions of meaning to their opponentsto consider whether they themselves are really free of verificationist as-sumptions. As he sees it, even rigorous versions of nonsensicalism areliable to being arbitrarily stipulative.Dearden’s discussion compounds two highly complex issues: meaningand self-deception. A simpler approach would be to point out that thereis no objective or absolute criterion of meaning upon which we couldestablish that something is nonsensical or not. Meaning depends al-ways upon intersubjective criteria. A language’s grammar is normative.Speakers and researchers are motivated by curiosity or non-cognitiveinterests.Book Reviews 367Within the framework of Argumentation Theory, if an opponent (O)accuses a proponent (P) of spouting nonsense, P may reply by avowinghis interest in contributing towards a theory of something. The burden ofproof is upon O to show how P’s proposal is inadequate to the purpose ofthe debate. P’s proposal may indeed be inadequate, but that will dependupon the issue and the rules of the debate, which may be conventional.For example, in a debate among theists concerning theodicy, an atheistapproach will violate a fundamental assumption of the debate and mayhence be deemed not only inappropriate, but also nonsensical. By re-jecting the atheist’s view as nonsensical to the theistic debate, one wouldnot impute him an illusion of meaning, but exclude him as a participantfor violating the rules of the debate.In response to this, Dearden would be right to point out that then,strictly speaking, it is a mistake to deny meaning to the atheist’s pro-posal. The atheist’s suggestion to simply drop the concept of a personalGod is offensive but not meaningless or unintelligible to theists. There isno need to disabuse the atheist regarding the meaningfulness of his pro-posal. What the atheist needs is to be reminded of the rules constrainingthe debate.One can treat nonsensicalism as a fallacy and define it as an unfairdismissal of an opponent’s argument, for it violates the principle of char-ity. Dearden does not spell this out as he could, but it is not hard torealize its implications for philosophical debate.Self-deception, however, may occur if a participant is not fully awareof the rules of the game. Students of musical composition often believethat the weird chord they have just discovered at the piano is new whenit actually is not. Music lacks a definite meaning although it may mimicsounds of Nature and non-verbal forms of vocal expression. It is notuncommon for composers to believe that they can express somethingto their audience, no matter how indefinitely as it were. In this case,the attribution of an illusion of meaning to the composer does seemwarranted, but no propositional knowledge is involved.In Philosophy, however, the nonsensicalist accusation is much lessconvincing, for philosophers are characteristically trying to debate con-ceptual issues according to certain rules and within a certain tradition.They seek to be aware of the rules and to comply with them. There is,therefore, much less room for an illusion of meaning to occur. If I amaware of the rules of the debate and I believe my statement to be relevant,then it cannot be meaningless, no matter what the nonsensicalist alleges.368 Book ReviewsDearden’s book is carefully argued and it is an important contri-bution to Metaphilosophy and Argumentation Theory. Hopefully, fromnow on accusations of unintentionally saying nonsense will be wieldedmore cautiously in the field.Tristan G. TorrianiSchool of Applied SciencesLimeira CampusState University of CampinasCampinas, Braziltristan.torriani@fca.unicamp.br

Ian Dearden, “Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense? An inquiry into the possibility of illusions of meaning”, Revised Edition, Rellet Press, 2013

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Ian Dearden, “Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense? An inquiry into the possibility of illusions of meaning”, Revised Edition, Rellet Press, 2013

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