We examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artifcial Moral Agents
(AMAs) and its rebuttal by Formosa and Ryan (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian
ethical background. Neither Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) essay nor Formosa and Ryan’s (JAMA
10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) is explicitly framed within the teachings of a specifc ethical school. The former
appeals to the lack of “both empirical and intuitive support” (Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019, p. 721) for AMAs, and
the latter opts for “argumentative breadth over depth”, meaning to provide “the essential groundwork for making an all
things considered judgment regarding the moral case for building AMAs” (Formosa and Ryan 2019, pp. 1–2). Although
this strategy may beneft their acceptability, it may also detract from their ethical rootedness, coherence, and persuasiveness, characteristics often associated with consolidated ethical traditions. Neo-Aristotelian ethics, backed by a distinctive
philosophical anthropology and worldview, is summoned to fll this gap as a standard to test these two opposing claims. It
provides a substantive account of moral agency through the theory of voluntary action; it explains how voluntary action is
tied to intelligent and autonomous human life; and it distinguishes machine operations from voluntary actions through the
categories of poiesis and praxis respectively. This standpoint reveals that while Van Wynsberghe and Robbins may be right
in rejecting the need for AMAs, there are deeper, more fundamental reasons. In addition, despite disagreeing with Formosa
and Ryan’s defense of AMAs, their call for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach, similar to neo-Aristotelian
practical wisdom, becomes expedient