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Attacks On a Double Length Blockcipher-based Hash Proposal
Authors
Xuejia Lai
Yiyuan Luo
Publication date
19 August 2016
Publisher
International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
Abstract
In this paper we attack a
2
n
2n
2
n
-bit double length hash function proposed by Lee et al. This proposal is a blockcipher-based hash function with hash rate
2
/
3
2/3
2/3
. The designers claimed that it could achieve ideal collision resistance and gave a security proof. However, we find a collision attack with complexity of
Ω
(
2
3
n
/
4
)
\Omega(2^{3n/4})
Ω
(
2
3
n
/4
)
and a preimage attack with complexity of
Ω
(
2
n
)
\Omega(2^{n})
Ω
(
2
n
)
. Our result shows this construction is much worse than an ideal
2
n
2n
2
n
-bit hash function
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oai:eprint.iacr.org:2011/238
Last time updated on 25/08/2023