International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
Abstract
Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are a necessity to secure
the physical devices connected to the Internet. Two AE schemes,
TinyJambu and Elephant, are finalists of NIST lightweight
cryptography competition. Another AE scheme, ACORN v3, a
CAESAR competition finalist, has been shown to be particularly
vulnerable against Differential Fault Attack (DFA), even more
than its previous version ACORN v2. TinyJambu is also
susceptible to DFA. An optimized interpolation attack has been
proposed against one instance of Elephant, Delirium, recently.
We propose methods to strengthen these schemes using the
Cellular Automata (CA) and increase their resistance to these
attacks. The Programmable Cellular Automata (PCA) 90-150
is effectively deployed to make these ciphers robust against
DFA. We also provide mathematical analysis of the invigorated
schemes and show that significant improvement is achieved in all
the three enhanced schemes