International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
Abstract
The mechanism for traditional Searchable Symmetric Encryption is pay-then-use. That is to say, if a user wants to search some documents that contain special keywords, he needs to pay to the server firstly, then he can enjoy search service. Under this situation, these kinds of things will happen: After the user paying the service fees, the server may either disappear because of the poor management or returning nothing. As a result, the money that the user paid cannot be brought back quickly. Another case is that the server may return incorrect document sets to the user in order to save his own cost. Once such events happen, it needs the arbitration institution to mediate which will cost a long time. Besides, to settle the disputes the user has to pay to the arbitration institution. Ideally, we deeply hope that when the user realizes the server has a tendency to cheat in the task of searching, he can immediately and automatically withdraw his money to safeguard his right. However, the existing SSE protocols cannot satisfy this demand.
To solve this dilemma, we find a compromised method by introducing the block chain into SSE. Our scheme achieves three goals stated below. Firstly, when the server does not return any thing to user after he gets the search token, the user can get some compensation from the server, because the server can infer some important information from the Index and this token. Besides, the user also doesn\u27t pay the service charge. Secondly, if the documents that the server returns are false, the server cannot receive service fees, meanwhile, he will be punished. Lastly, when the user receives some bitcoin from server at the beginning, he may terminate the protocol. Under this situation, the server is a victim. In order to prevent such thing from happening, the server will broadcast a transaction to redeem his pledge after an appointed time
