The topic of this thesis is the metaphysical theory of generalism: the view that
the world is constituted by purely general facts. Whilst the connection may not be
immediately obvious, generalism is also touted as a qualitative metaphysics: a theory
that seeks to elevate, in some important metaphysical sense, the notion of qualities
(i.e. properties and relations) over that of objects. As such, generalism is just as well
individuated by its categorial commitments—its commitment to the fundamentality
of certain metaphysical categories—as it is by its construal of fundamental facts.
My aim in this thesis is to make explicit these connections, providing a proper
explication of the generalist position, as well as its motivations and its apparent
consequences. Beyond this, the thesis can also be read as an extended argument
in favour of individualism: the view that holds, contrary to generalism, that the
category of individual, or object, is at least as fundamental as that of property and
relation.
The subtitle of this thesis, ‘symmetries, non-individuals and ontological nihilism’,
alludes to the topic addressed by each of the three chapters. In chapter 1 I explicate and critique the generalist’s primary argument against individualism, one
based on the notion of a symmetry. In chapter 2 I investigate the tenability of a
position dubbed ‘quantifier generalism’, a position that, I argue, can be further explicated through the notion of a non-individual. And in chapter 3 I turn to the most
widely-discussed form of generalism found in the literature: algebraic generalism, a
(purported) form of ontological nihlism
