The concept of cyber deception has been receiving emerging attention. The
development of cyber defensive deception techniques requires interdisciplinary
work, among which cognitive science plays an important role. In this work, we
adopt a signaling game framework between a defender and a human agent to
develop a cyber defensive deception protocol that takes advantage of the
cognitive biases of human decision-making using quantum decision theory to
combat insider attacks (IA). The defender deceives an inside human attacker by
luring him to access decoy sensors via generators producing perceptions of
classical signals to manipulate the human attacker's psychological state of
mind. Our results reveal that even without changing the classical traffic data,
strategically designed generators can result in a worse performance for
defending against insider attackers in identifying decoys than the ones in the
deceptive scheme without generators, which generate random information based on
input signals. The proposed framework leads to fundamental theories in
designing more effective signaling schemes