In this paper I intend to point at an ambiguous interconnection between the theory of public reason (exemplified by John Rawls and Gerald Gaus), and the idea of human dignity understood as a universally binding, distinguished moral status and inherent value of every human person. The public reason theorist do not examine human dignity at length, whereas, as I am trying to show in the paper, it constitutes a necessary component of the theory. The argument for the necessity of human dignity within public reason boils down to the two main theses: (1) courts, international law bodies, as well as constitutional state authorities constantly refer to human dignity as a crucial commitment present in the law; and (2) public reason theory which sets human dignity aside suffers from an explanatory gap. As a way of providing a solution to this, I propose to examine the neo-thomist ethics developed by Tadeusz Styczeń. As I will show in the paper, combining an attempt the two theories is an interesting research program, and allows to reconcile both human dignity and public justifiability of legal rules
