The aftermath of the 44-day Second Karabakh War resulted in the significant superiority and final victory of Azerbaijan, and the liberation of occupied territories revealed a nationwide plan for socioeconomic development. Currently, the rising actuality of the resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) in their freed homeland is the primary focus of both governmental and societal discourse. This article highlights the resettlement potential in Azerbaijan’s postwar territories. A survey unveils a high rate of repatriation intention among IDPs and substantial resettlement potential among non-IDPs

Aliyev, Khatai

Gazanfarli, Mirvari

Maharramova, Shabnam

Musayev, Akif

English

SSOAR - Social Science Open Access Repository 

www.ssoar.infoPostwar Karabakh: What Is the ResettlementPotential?Musayev, Akif; Aliyev, Khatai; Maharramova, Shabnam; Gazanfarli, MirvariVeröffentlichungsversion / Published VersionZeitschriftenartikel / journal articleEmpfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:Musayev, A., Aliyev, K., Maharramova, S., & Gazanfarli, M. (2022). Postwar Karabakh: What Is the ResettlementPotential? Caucasus Analytical Digest, 128, 10-14. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-87038-2Nutzungsbedingungen:Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zurVerfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen findenSie hier:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.deTerms of use:This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Informationsee:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 128, July 2022 10• Avdaliani, Emil. 8 November, 2021. 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Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.• Huseynov, Rusif and Scotti, Simona. 20 November 2021. Armenia-Turkey rapprochement on horizon? Top Chu-bakhov Center. https://top-center.org/en/analytics/3275/armenia-turkey-rapprochement-on-horizon• International Republican Institute and Center for Insights in Survey Research. 2021. “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia”. Available at: https://www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-surveyresidents-of-armenia/• Iskandaryan, Alexander and Minasyan, Sergey. January 1, 2010. Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations. Caucasus Institute Research Papers. Available at: https://dealingwiththepast.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CI_2010-AM-TR-Relations-eng.pdf• Tol, Gönül. February 17, 2022. Fragile promise: The prospects for Turkish-Armenian normalization. Middle East Institute. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/fragile-promise-prospects-turkish-armenian-normalization• Shangoyan, Markar. 7 February 2022. From “positive signals” to normalization: Negotiating the Armenian – Turk-ish rapprochement. Caucasus Watch. Available at: https://caucasuswatch.de/news/4850.html/• Vartanyan, Olesya, Goksel, Nigar and Shiriyev, Zaur. 13 January 2022. Turkey-Armenia Talks Hold Promise of Opening Long-Shut Border. International Crisis Group. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/armenia/turkey-armenia-talks-hold-promise-opening-long-shut-borderPostwar Karabakh: What Is the Resettlement Potential?By Akif Musayev (Institute of Economics, Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, Baku, Azerbaijan), Khatai Aliyev (UNEC Empirical Research Center, Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan), Shabnam Maharramova (Public Relations, Communication and Digital Content Management, ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan), Mirvari Gazanfarli (Institute of Economics, Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, Baku, Azerbaijan)AbstractThe aftermath of the 44-day Second Karabakh War resulted in the significant superiority and final victory of Azerbaijan, and the liberation of occupied territories revealed a nationwide plan for socioeconomic develop-ment. Currently, the rising actuality of the resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) in their freed homeland is the primary focus of both governmental and societal discourse. This article highlights the reset-tlement potential in Azerbaijan’s postwar territories. A survey unveils a high rate of repatriation intention among IDPs and substantial resettlement potential among non-IDPs.IntroductionTowards the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first eth-nic identity-based crises within the Union after World War II emerged in the Nagorno-Karabakh region (Aske-rov, 2020). The conflict left approximately 1 million ref-ugees and internally displaced people (IDP) related to Azerbaijan, while the country lost 20% of its interna-tionally recognized territory as well. During the war, resi-dents of the occupied settlements witnessed ethnic clean-sing and the massive violation of human rights by the CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 128, July 2022 11Armenian military forces (Cornell, 1997). The number of people living in the occupied districts in 1990 is rep-resented by the following figures: Khankendi—56.9 thousand; Khojaly—21.2 thousand; Khojavend—41.7 thousand; Shusha—21.3 thousand; Agdam—145.5 thousand; Fuzuli—96 thousand; Jabrayil—49.4 thou-sand; Kalbadjar—56.6 thousand; Gubadli—28.7 thou-sand; Lachin—52.7 thousand; and Zangilan—31.4 thousand (SSCAR, 2022). While the population of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was primarily ethnic Armenian (77% out of 189 thousand people), only 5–6% of them were located in Lachin (European Court of Human Rights, 2015). Ethnic Azerbaijanis were dominant in Lachin and the surrounding districts.This conflict has been “unfreezing” since 2011 and culminated with the Four-Day War in April 2016 (Shi-rinyan, 2016). The next critical clashes between Arme-nia and Azerbaijan military forces emerged in July 2020 –less than 3 months before the 44-day war.On September 27, 2020, the conflict erupted into a war that lasted 44 days. Azerbaijan declared the libera-tion of Jabrayil (October 4), Fuzuli (October 17), Zangi-lan (October 20), Gubadli (October 25) and Shusha city (November 8) during the war. On November 9, 2020, a trilateral agreement signed by Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia ended the hostilities. As per the conditions of the agreement, Armenia returned the remainder of the occupied territories to the Azerbaijan districts of Agdam (November 20), Kalbadjar (November 25) and Lachin (December 1) within the same year.Now, the primary issue for Azerbaijan is whether the government will be able to resettle the liberated regions and allow to the return of IDPs. Will IDPs return? What is the resettlement potential in Karabakh?Postwar Challenges: What Comes Next?The war ended, yet a new challenge began. Liberated dis-tricts were found to be destroyed, with no infrastruc-ture remaining for the resettlement of IDPs. However, the more crucial challenge consists of the landmines planted by the Armenian military forces, which threaten the lives of civilians. The magnitude of the problem is clear in the context of the provision of landmine maps presented by Armenia (Wolkov, 2021; Mehdiyev, 2021). The number of landmines in the region is still unknown. The presence of massive landmines and unexploded ord-nance in liberated areas make resettlement difficult, and the removal process will take several years to conclude.Despite these hurdles, transformation is happening at a breathtaking speed (Troianovski, 2021). In 2021, Azerbaijan allocated 1.5 billion USD for the reconstruc-tion of liberated territories, followed by 1.2 billion USD (2.2 billion AZN) in 2022 to be used to restore infra-structure (including electricity, gas, water, communica-tions, roads, education, health), as well as cultural and historical monuments (Azernews, 2022). Repatriation to liberated areas is one of five key national priorities up to 2030. The construction and inauguration of the Fuzuli International Airport within less than a year, as well as the building of airports in Lachin and Zangi-lan, the opening of a new road (“Zəfər Yolu”) to Shusha, and the confirmation of master plans of development for liberated territories (for example, Agdam city), are some of the works that have been conducted in Kara-bakh. The frequent visits of the President of the Repub-lic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, to the region also recon-firms that the rebuilding and resettlement of Karabakh is a strategic issue.However, the repatriation of IDPs depends on many factors. After 28 years of occupation, IDP families have new realities that will affect their decision about a return, considering that the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance could undermine their resettlement intentions. On the other hand, the majority of Azerbaijani IDPs lived in the most deplorable conditions and experienced psychological trauma over the course of decades, which might be a driving factor for their willingness to return (Guliyev, 2020).Data and MethodologyThe examination of a large-scale national self-admin-istered survey conducted by a nongovernmental inde-pendent agency (ASERC, 2021) allows some predic-tions about resettlement intentions among IDPs and non-IDPs. The survey does not specifically focus on the repatriation issue; rather, it aims to study welfare in society and public opinion about selected issues. There are three related questions about the subject. The pri-mary question is “Would you like to settle and permanently live in Karabakh?” with the following response options:1. Yes, as soon as possible upon being allowed.2. Yes, but I must be sure that my life standards will be better there.3. I have never thought about this.4. No.Pragmatically, the respondents who choose option 1 or 2 can be considered returnees and are much more likely to be potential repatriants. In particular, the “more val-uable” category is those who choose the first answer option.Another question asks whether the respondent is an IDP or non-IDP (originally from Karabakh or other regions). The third related question identifies whether the respondent would like to assist with the rebuild-ing and development of Karabakh as an employee. This question aims to check the reliability of responses. Logically, potential repatriants should be interested in CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 128, July 2022 12engagement in the rebuilding process, which would bring them earlier prospective employment guarantees.It must be noted that the survey used a self-adminis-tered questionnaire conducted online from September 10 to November 6, 2021. Among 2208 respondents (mean age is 34.6), 44.7% are males, 54.2% are females, 7.7% (169 persons) are IDPs and 4.3% are non-IDPs but orig-inate from the Karabakh region.The Big Question: Will IDPs Return?According to the survey, repatriation intentions among IDPs are quite high, while a substantial portion of non-IDP respondents are also interested in settling in Kara-bakh and permanently living there (Table 1). Among the surveyed IDPs, 46.2% want to settle in Karabakh as soon as possible. Among the others, 40.2% intend to settle on the condition of having better life standards. Overall, the repatriation potential among the IDPs is approximately 87.3%. Regarding the non-IDPs, the rate is higher among those who have origination ties with Karabakh compared with those who do not (89.3% and 72.1%, respectively). Slightly less than 1/3 of the remain-ing respondents are interested in settling and perma-nently living in Karabakh.Among the IDPs, repatriation intention represents the highest rate among those aged 50–64, of whom 89.5% want to settle in Karabakh as soon as possible. The underlying factor is that these individuals witnessed the Karabakh region before its occupation. The repatriation intention slightly decreases to 90.2% among those aged 35–49. Among young adults, the repatriation intention is comparatively lower. Although the respondents aged 17–34 have mostly never seen Karabakh before, 38.7% of them emphasize their desire to settle in the region as soon as possible.Simultaneously, respondents show a high level of intention for engagement in the rebuilding of postcon-flict areas (Table 2). A total of 13.8% of all respondents intend to take a role in the rebuilding process if they receive any job offer, while 28.2% expect an appropriate (related) job offer. In contrast, the overall engagement intention among IDPs is 79.8%. A total of 26.6% are open to any job offer, while 40.8% expect to have a rele-vant job offer.ConclusionEffective repatriation to postwar Karabakh is a strate-gic goal for Azerbaijan in the current decade. Despite the fact that the war has ended and active military oper-ations have ceased, the presence of massive landmines and unexploded ordnance and the destruction of infra-structure in the liberated areas make immediate repatri-ation challenging. The changes in the lifestyle of IDPs over the past 2.5 decades or more also negatively affect repatriation intention.Nevertheless, a recent social survey conducted among people in Azerbaijan (including IDPs) presents evidence of high repatriation intention (over 80%) in all age groups. Simultaneously, many respondents who represent non-IDPs also report an intention to perma-nently settle in Karabakh. Current observations show that a large portion of potential repatriants are waiting for the government’s decision regarding the details and start of the general movement process. Table 3 tabu-lates the basic sociodemographic profile of potential repatriants, which represents a total sample ratio for each category.To efficiently manage repatriation and promote per-manent settlement, it would be preferable if the Azerbai-jani government could sustain prospective repatriants’ involvement in the rebuilding activities of freed lands (as shown in Table 2). Overall, the preferences of potential repatriants will be unveiled during the massive resettle-ment period. An online platform that brings employers and potential repatriants together would further enhance the permanent settling probability of individuals. With-out such measures in place, the enormous numbers of repatriants could cause serious failures and management gaps during resettlement in postwar Karabakh.About the AuthorsAkif Musayev is the director of the Postconflict Scientific Center for Territorial Rehabilitation within the ANAS İnsti-tute of Economics (Baku, Azerbaijan).Khatai Aliyev is the director of the UNEC Empirical Research Center within Azerbaijan State University of Eco-nomics (UNEC) (Baku, Azerbaijan).Shabnam Maharramova is a public relations specialist at ADA University (Baku, Azerbaijan).Mirvari Gazanfarli is a researcher at the Postconflict Scientific Center for Territorial Rehabilitation within the ANAS İnstitute of Economics (Baku, Azerbaijan).References• ASERC (2021). Social Survey-7. Unpublished dataset.• Askerov, Ali (2020). The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict. Post-Soviet Conflicts: The Thirty Years’ Crisis, 55.CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 128, July 2022 13• Azernews. (2022). Azerbaijan to audit funds allocated for Karabakh reconstruction. https://www.azernews.az/nation/192930.html (accessed 25 May 2022).• Cornell, Svante E (1997). Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 20, 1–23.• European Court of Human Rights. (2015). Case of Chiragov and others v. Armenia (Application no. 13216/05). https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-155353%22]} (accessed 25 May, 2022).• Guliyev, Farid. (2020). Why are Azerbaijanis fighting for Karabakh? The Trauma and Burden of the Forgotten Exodus. https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/11/2020/why-are-azerbaijanis-fighting-karabakh-trauma-and-burden-forgotten-exodus (accessed 25 May 2022).• Mehdiyev, Mushvig. (2021). Azerbaijan receives maps of 92,000 Armenian mines in Karabakh region. https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-receives-maps-of-92000-armenian-mines-in-karabakh-region-2021-7-5-0/ (accessed 21 February 2022).• Shirinyan, A. (2016). The evolving dilemma of the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. Security and human rights, 27(3-4), 467–478.• State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan Republic [SSCAR] (2022). Azərbaycan Respublikasının iqtisadi və inzi-bati şəhər və rayonları üzrə əhalinin sayının dəyişməsi. https://www.stat.gov.az/source/demoqraphy/az/001_18.xls (accessed 30 January 2022).• Troianovski, Anton (2021). In Nagorno-Karabakh, land mines, bulldozers and lingering tensions. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/25/world/europe/azerbaijan-armenia-nagorno-karabakh.html, (accessed 20 February 2022).• Wolkov, Nicole (2021). Azerbaijan and Armenia swap military detainees and land-mine maps. https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security-and-politics-program-spp/azerbaijan-and-armenia-swap-military-detainees-and-land-mine-maps (accessed 30 January 2022).TablesTable 1: Repatriation Intentions to KarabakhWould you like to settle and permanently live in Karabakh? IDPsNon-IDPsRegistered but has no IDP statusOriginally from KarabakhAll othersYes, as soon as possible upon being allowed. 46.2% 42.9% 25.0% 6.7%Yes, but I must be sure that my life standards will be better there.40.2% 46.4% 47.1% 23.8%I have never thought about this. 5.3% 0.0% 17.6% 30.3%No. 8.3% 10.7% 10.3% 39.2%Total by column 100% 100% 100% 100%CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 128, July 2022 14Table 2: Intention of Permanently Settling and Being Involved in the Rebuilding Process in KarabakhWould you like to be involved (on a paid basis) in the rebuilding of Karabakh?Yes, as soon as possible upon allowedYes, but might be sure that my life standards will be better over thereI have never thought about thisNoAll repondentsYes, I am ready for any job engagement. 42.3% 14.7% 0.0% 14.3% 26.6%Yes, but only for employment oppor-tunities relevant to my area of special-ization.47.4% 42.6% 22.2% 7.1% 40.8%Yes, but this is impossible now (family reasons, etc.).3.8% 22.1% 22.2% 7.1% 12.4%I have never thought about it. 2.7% 11.8% 55.6% 7.1% 9.5%No. 3.8% 8.8% 0.0% 64.4% 10.7%Total by column 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%Table 3: Sociodemographic Profile of Potential RepatriantsPotential repatriants Ratio of the whole sampleIDPs Non-IDPsBy gender identityMale 45.8% 50.1% 45.2%Female 54.2% 49.9% 54.8%By marital statusMarried 56% 49.5% 51.2%Unmarried 44% 50.5% 48.8%By highest educational attainmentPrebachelor 35.6% 25.1% 28.7%Bachelor 42.5% 47.2% 46.1%Post-bachelor 21.9% 27.7% 25.2%By employment statusEmployed 60.3% 64.2% 61.2%Unemployed 19.2% 18.4% 18.1%Not in labour force 20.5% 17.4% 20.7%

Postwar Karabakh: What Is the Resettlement Potential?

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Postwar Karabakh: What Is the Resettlement Potential?

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