From May 2021 to 2023, Russia will hold the chairmanship of the Arctic Council for the second time in the forum’s history. As chair, it will lead the collective efforts of the foremost regional deliberative body, comprised of the eight Arctic nations, six permanent participants representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples, six working groups, and thirty-nine observer states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This represents a critical opportunity for the host country to orchestrate focused attention on the importance of the Arctic through its particular lens

Bouffard, Troy J

Lackenbauer, P. Whitney

English

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www.ssoar.infoThe Russian Arctic Council Chairmanship: NationalSecurity Considerations in the Shadow of RegionalCooperationBouffard, Troy J; Lackenbauer, P. WhitneyVeröffentlichungsversion / Published VersionZeitschriftenartikel / journal articleEmpfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:Bouffard, T. J., & Lackenbauer, P. W. (2021). The Russian Arctic Council Chairmanship: National SecurityConsiderations in the Shadow of Regional Cooperation. Russian Analytical Digest, 269, 2-4. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000494293Nutzungsbedingungen:Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zurVerfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen findenSie hier:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.deTerms of use:This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Informationsee:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-87925-3RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 269, 27 June 2021 2ANALYSISThe Russian Arctic Council Chairmanship: National Security Considerations in the Shadow of Regional CooperationBy Troy J. Bouffard (University of Alaska Fairbanks) and P. Whitney Lackenbauer (Trent University)DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000494293AbstractFrom May 2021 to 2023, Russia will hold the chairmanship of the Arctic Council for the second time in the forum’s history. As chair, it will lead the collective efforts of the foremost regional deliberative body, com-prised of the eight Arctic nations, six permanent participants representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples, six working groups, and thirty-nine observer states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This represents a critical opportunity for the host country to orchestrate focused attention on the importance of the Arctic through its particular lens.Although the Arctic Council conducts itself through consensus decision-making and ultimately speaks with a single voice, the potential to synchronize and leverage opportunities alongside official activities pro-vides a window of opportunity for Russia to solidify its Arctic-related national interests. The forum’s charter forbids the discussion of hard security issues under its auspices, thus ensuring that high politics associated with great power competition in the military sphere do not inhibit the Council’s ability to address environ-mental and human security issues. Although inter-state and sub-state cooperation and adherence to established international norms help to mitigate these concerns, increased defense-related activities and strategic com-petition influence how political actors and policymakers frame regional dynamics.Anticipating the Russian chairmanship encourages sober reflection on how Russia might seek to advance its national interests in the Circumpolar Arctic over the next two years and the implications of these actions for the other Arctic states and regional rightsholders. Although the members of the forum will generally avoid upsetting protocol and expected conduct during official Arctic Council events, Russia will seek to advance its national interests in non-official activities hosted con-currently. In this short reflection, we discuss ways in which Russia can implicitly and explicitly engage with strategic security issues during its tenure as chair while conforming to the expectations and constraints associ-ated with that formal role.Fundamental Security Circumstances of the ArcticIn 2007, Russian expeditioners planted a titanium national flag on the seabed at the North Pole, generating excitement about sovereign rights and the enabling role of advanced technology in facilitating access to hitherto inaccessible polar spaces. The following year, the United States Geological Survey’s seminal (if overly optimistic) study estimated undiscovered oil and gas reserves in the Circumpolar Arctic, sparking international excitement about an alleged “race for resources” (even though the lion’s share of resources fell within the well-established sovereign jurisdictions of the coastal states). Alongside irrefutable evidence of diminishing sea ice and scientific models predicting greater maritime accessibility to Arc-tic waters in the future, these developments thrust the circumpolar region into a new era of competition. The prospect of more reliable access, matched with geopo-litical motivations to access regional resources and ship-ping routes, sparked the imagination of both Arctic and non-Arctic states.Given the United States’ “hyperpower” status, Rus-sia’s relatively robust and rapid militarization of its Arctic Zone (buoyed by oil and gas revenues in the late 2000s) aroused modest attention. Although Russian adven-turism in Georgia and provocative statements by Putin (such as his 2007 Munich speech) suggested that Rus-sia would no longer adhere to the Western rulebook for international affairs, few commentators anticipated that Russia would upset the Arctic order. As the largest Arc-tic state and one that is heavily economically dependent on regional resources, it had the strongest vested inter-est in maintaining the regional status quo. Accordingly, Russian remilitarization of the Arctic remained more of a subject of academic debate than of strategic concern for the United States, its NATO allies, or its Partnership for Peace members in Finland and Sweden.In due course, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, aggressive activities in Eastern Ukraine and Syria, and increasingly belligerent rhetoric toward the West raised new concerns about whether the Arctic region could remain insulated from resurgent strategic competition globally. Fortunately, the Arctic Council’s limited man-date ensured that it could continue its work even in the face of Western sanctions on Russia. The Council’s RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 269, 27 June 2021 3working groups continued their important research; Senior Arctic Official and Ministerial meetings con-tinued unabated.Military cooperation in the region followed a differ-ent course. The United States and its allies suspended military-to-military contact with Russia in the wake of the Crimean invasion, thus removing formal mech-anisms for dialogue on Arctic security issues. Prior to sanctions, all of the Arctic states discussed security issues through the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and regular contact between the Northern Chiefs of Defense (NCHoDs). Such events allowed for transpa-rency and confidence-building, as well as making it pos-sible to establish rules to help manage military interac-tion and expectations in the region.The end of formal military contact since 2014 has forced the Arctic states to resort to other forms of strate-gic communication. Countries such as Canada, typically hesitant to have NATO articulate an explicit Arctic role and thus potentially provoke Russia, have changed their tune. The United States Department of Defense has pub-lished a recent suite of Arctic strategies and Congress has directed military-related infrastructure development in Alaska. In 2018, NATO mounted Trident Juncture, the largest military exercise in the Arctic since the Cold War, and in May 2020 three U.S. 6th Fleet warships and a UK Royal Navy frigate operated in the Barents Sea to “conduct maritime security operations” for the first time since the mid-1980s. More exercises of this nature are likely to follow as part of the strategic messaging dance between the Western allies and Russia.These developments involving the United States and NATO have generated apprehension in Russian circles. Although both Washington and Moscow have repeatedly indicated their respective interest in renewing formal Arctic security dialogue, such activity requires that the U.S. Secretaries of both Defense and State send concurrent notification to Congress for a specific waiver of the sanctions. Lawmakers would then have fifteen days to decide one way or the other. In the meantime, representatives from all the Arctic states except Rus-sia participated in the ASFR in Finland on May 5–6, 2021. Discussing critical Arctic security issues without the involvement of the largest Arctic state, however, has obvious limitations.The Arctic Council Chairmanship and Russian Security InterestsOn March 29, 2021, former Russian Senior Arctic Offi-cial Anton Vasiliev outlined the four priorities of the Russian Chairmanship:• the Arctic inhabitants, including indigenous peoples;• environmental protection and climate change;• social and economic growth;• further strengthening the Arctic Council—the key framework of international Arctic cooperation.Vasiliev insisted that “the game plan conceived by Rus-sia has many ideas, but no surprises,” given that “the Arctic Council is a collective body operated by consen-sus. It treats in a balanced way the two designated areas of the Arctic Council mandate—environmental protec-tion and sustainable development.”That being said, the four Arctic priorities connect directly to Russian strategic objectives: enhanced eco-nomic cooperation; investments in Arctic urban infra-structure, health care, education, and Indigenous wel-fare; and climate change. Furthermore, the strong emphasis on the “rational use of natural resources,” pres-ented in the language of stewardship and socio-eco-nomic wellbeing, reinforces Moscow’s strong emphasis on the energy and mining sectors. Broadly speaking, its main domestic Arctic interests center on “Development of the Arctic Zone” and management of the Northern Sea Route (NSR—Sevmorput / СМП—Севморпуть). Thus, promoting “safe and beneficial all-season navi-gation” in the NSR and enhancing search-and-rescue capacities dovetails with national priorities.The absence of any reference to strategic competition or the “growing potential for conflict in the Arctic” (as asserted in its October 2020 strategy) is unsurprising. Opportunities to invoke national security issues as part of Arctic Council deliberations and activities remain implausible—and ultimately counterproductive—for Russia as chair. During official Arctic Council events such as working group, plenary, and executive sessions, members are explicitly barred from discussing matters of military security per the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. Such issues cannot even be introduced to the agenda. Offer-ing an “off-script” intervention involving hard security issues would represent a significant breach of protocol.Thus, Moscow will avoid directly referencing national security considerations as Arctic Council chair and will emphasize its work to preserve the region as a territory of peace, stability, and constructive international coopera-tion. Nevertheless, analysts should recognize how Mos-cow’s position on many Arctic Council-related projects and initiatives intersects with its broader security prior-ities, both protecting its territories and resources and advancing its strategic deterrence capabilities. Military concerns will not take the form of an agenda item dur-ing Arctic Council business, but Russia will continue to find occasions—in events and activities organized in close proximity and timing to Council meetings—to articulate its national security interests and to accuse NATO of militarizing the Arctic and forcing the Krem-lin to strengthen its defenses. Senior officials will care-fully craft and authorize these statements, which will be synchronized and aligned with Putin’s requirements.RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 269, 27 June 2021 4Nikolay Korchunov, the Russian ambassador at large for the Arctic and the leading champion of Russia’s north-ern agenda, has articulated Russia’s Arctic interests, strate-gic plans, and chairmanship priorities since the start of this year. His framing of the official narrative illustrates how Russia can signal its national security interests in apparently benign statements that emphasize sustainable development, improved living conditions for Arctic resi-dents, biodiversity, and economic development. On the one hand, he emphasizes for international audiences that achieving these goals “require[s] the collective efforts of all participants in the Arctic G8.” On the other hand, when-ever Russian economic development, natural resources, and the NSR are mentioned to domestic audiences, this is backed by reassurances that the Kremlin is vigorously protecting national sovereignty and bolstering its regional military presence. Domestic discussion of relatively neu-tral topics like the environment or economic develop-ment—even in the context of Russia’s upcoming Arctic Council chairmanship—is generally linked to Russia’s national security interests. As such, Russia will not link Arctic defense and security considerations to its official agenda as chair of the Council, but we must acknowl-edge that they are never far out of mind.ConclusionRussia’s updated plan for the AZRF, unveiled in three 2020 strategic policy documents and an April 2021 implementation plan, provides essential insights into its broader Arctic strategy. It suggests that Russia is likely to highlight its Arctic developments and priorities in carefully crafted language during its 2021–23 chairman-ship of the Arctic Council, with the goal of expanding and enhancing its self-defined position in the Circum-polar North. It has set the major pieces in place to pur-sue a legitimizing campaign, and the world can expect consistent themes and messaging that emphasize the Arctic’s importance for Russia—and the centrality of Russia in circumpolar affairs. By linking issues that are a normal part of Arctic Council business with ancillary activities, Russia can promote and advance its national security priorities. This is part of an overarching strategy that does not seek to revise Arctic governance structures or undermine regional peace; instead, Moscow seeks to define the region in its preferred terms. The goal is to get other Arctic stakeholders to internalize and repeat the language and narratives that Russia is promoting, par-ticularly Russia’s self-perception as the largest, strongest, most developed—and most legitimate—Arctic player.During its Arctic Council chairmanship, Russia will also explore avenues for how it can use Arctic narratives and relationships to facilitate a “return to normalcy” and frame the dialogue in a manner consistent with its national priorities and interests. Strategic messages intended to encourage further rapprochement with other Arctic countries align with an institutional norm/prac-tice within the Arctic Council that cooperation through-out the region should be buffered from external con-flict where possible. They are also crafted to advance national self-interest and solidify frames that position Russia as the most legitimate Arctic rightsholder. How the other Arctic states respond to such framing activ-ities and advance a cooperative agenda while countering narratives prejudicial to their interests and values remains an enduring challenge—and one that we anticipate will become increasingly critical over the next two years.About the AuthorsTroy J. Bouffard is the Director of the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he is faculty in the School of Management. He is also a Defense Contractor with USNORTHCOM as well as a project member of the Arctic Council’s EPPR working group.Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and a Professor in the School of Study of Canada at Trent University. He is also the Director of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN).References• “Establishment of the Arctic Council.” U.S. Department of State, accessed 03 August, 2020, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/establishmentarcticcouncil/index.htm.• Bouffard, Troy J. Buchanan, Elizabeth. “With or without You: Arctic Security Dialogue Is Meaningful Even with-out Russia, but Here’s How to Involve Moscow in the Future—and Why We Should.” West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 04 May 2021. https://mwi.usma.edu/with-or-without-you-arctic-security-dialogue-is-meaningful-even-without-russia-but-heres-how-to-involve-moscow-in-the-future-and-why-we-should/.• Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Troy J. Bouffard. “Positioning Russia in the Circumpolar Arctic: Narrative, (De)Legitimizing Discourses, and a Framing Environment.” In Quick Impact, Peterborough, Ontario: North Ameri-can and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), 17 January 2021.• Myers, Steve Lee. “Arctic Council Meeting Starts Amid Russia Tensions.” New York Times (New York, NY), 25 April 2015, A, 7. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/us/politics/arctic-council-meeting-russia.html.

The Russian Arctic Council Chairmanship: National Security Considerations in the Shadow of Regional Cooperation

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The Russian Arctic Council Chairmanship: National Security Considerations in the Shadow of Regional Cooperation

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