Corporate manslaughter, regulation and 'seeking to profit'

Abstract

One of the concepts included in current draft legislation on corporate manslaughter is that of seeking to profit. The paper seeks to examine this concept and whether the assumptions underlying it are valid. Firstly, the concept is examined in terms of managerial economics, where it is argued that there is no necessarily direct trade-off between profit and safety expenditure. It is also difficult to disentangle expectation of profit and actual profit realisation in relation to a single cost factor. Recent literature on longer-term managerial decision making suggests that there is a range of company attitudes to both profit and safety which do not necessarily trade one off against the other. Other research suggests widespread ignorance among senior managers about actual safety-related expenditure. Turning to the public sector, it is possible to find a safety-economic gain trade-off both in government operating practice and in decision making about the introduction of regulations. Health and safety regulations themselves are not always appropriate or practical in all situations and in some cases may bring into question project viability. The paper concludes that the assumptions underlying the concept of seeking to profit are invalid and that it should be omitted from the legislation. © 2006 RICS, The Bartlett School, UCL and the contributors First published