The Institute for Fiscal Studies, UCL (University College London), The Institute for Fiscal Studies
Doi
Abstract
This paper exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the impact thata multi-dimensional group incentive scheme had on branch performance in a largedistribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, wasimplemented in all branches in one division, but not in another. Branches from thesecond division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the balancedscorecard had some impact, but that it varied with branch characteristics, and inparticular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond tothe new incentives. This paper exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the impact thata multi-dimensional group incentive scheme had on branch performance in a largedistribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, wasimplemented in all branches in one division, but not in another. Branches from thesecond division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the balancedscorecard had some impact, but that it varied with branch characteristics, and inparticular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond tothe new incentives
