Hurd, Ian

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Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations Volume 5 Issue 1 Women & Children Article 6 3-1-2005 Of Words and Wars: The Security Council's Hard Life Among the Great Powers Ian Hurd Northwestern University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/diplo_ir  Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Hurd, Ian (2005) "Of Words and Wars: The Security Council's Hard Life Among the Great Powers," Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 6. Available at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/diplo_ir/vol5/iss1/6 Of Words and Wars: The Security Council'sHard Life Among the Great Powersby Ian HurdIn assessing the damage done to the UN by the Iraq-U.S. war, many commentatorshave found reason to conclude that the episode represents the final, fatal blow to along-suffering institution. Michael Glennon recently concluded that the UN SecurityCouncil has finally "fallen victim to geopolitical forces too strong to withstand,"1and no less a light than Richard Perle calls it the "parting irony" of Hussein's reignthat "he will take the UN down with him."2 The ruins of the Iraqi regime symbolizefor Perle "the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through internationallaw." Far from lamenting this development, these writers celebrate it-"the worldwill be better off for it" says Charles Krauthammer-as the beginning of a new"realism" in American foreign policy, a moment comparable to E.H. Carr's decisivecritique of liberal idealism at the end of the Second World War.3Today's argument, repeated in newspapers by columnists and off-the-record byU.S. officials, goes like this: since the UN represented "a grand attempt to subjectthe use of force to the rule of law,"4 the opposition in the UN to the American attackon Iraq stands as evidence that this does not work. More generally, the Americanunipolar moment means a shift in international power "toward a configuration that[is] simply incompatible with the way the UN was meant to function."5 Therefore,according to Charles Krauthammer, continuing to look for policy guidance from the"corrupt, perverse, institutional relic" that is the UN is a strategic and moral mistake.6This analysis is wrong. It is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of thenature of the Security Council, one that sees the Council in moralistic and legalterms rather than in realistic political terms, and it leads to a wrong policy conclusion.Ironically, Perle and others who would dismiss the UN as powerless, share with theprogressive idealists an over-inflated sense of the Council's power, purpose, andambition in the world. Both criticize the Council for failing to act-either forfailing to support or failing to prevent the war. Getting the Council wrong in thisway is extremely significant, since it means these writers also get wrong their analysisof the future of American power. A more realistic assessment of the origins andfunction of the Council is crucial for making sensible policy in the new age ofAmerican dominance-the budding American unipolar hegemony will be strongerif built on a foundation that includes the Security Council.Ian Hurd is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. He has publishedwidely on the UN Security Council and the problems of legitimation.69Seton HallJournal ofDiplomacy and International Relations70 HURDGreater realism in assessing the UN would recognize that the Security Councilis at its heart a political pact among the Great Powers, the five permanent membersof the Council, to keep the peace among themselves. The Council, born in thelaborious diplomacy of Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco, enshrines theprinciple that the more powerful states should manage the international system onbehalf of the rest, and it institutionalizes this principle in the device of the veto.This is neither a system for emancipating the less powerful states, nor one thatrequires that the Great Powers subject themselves to collective decisions aboutinternational security. Both the liberal and conservative critics perpetuate the myththat it is the Council's job to rein in the Great Powers. Far from Glennon's imagined"legalist institution" in opposition to "geopolitical forces," the Council comes froma realistic political compromise among the powerful.7To see this, one must return briefly to the basic document setting out the Council'spowers: the UN Charter. It is here that both the substantive, legal authority of theCouncil and the procedural mechanism of the veto by which that power is limitedare spelled out. Taking these two together, one sees the "problem" the founders ofthe UN saw themselves as addressing-avoiding conflict among the Great Powers.The founders of the Council were not looking to protect the weak from the adventuresof the strong or to impede the strong in their periodic fits of imperialism.THE SECURITY COUNCIL's AUTHORITY AND PROCEDUREThe legal authority of the Council in the international system is impressivelybroad. As the central location in the UN for international security, the Council mayintervene in the domestic affairs of states when these are thought to pose a threat tointernational peace and security. Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Council candecide to take any action "by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary" to "restoreinternational peace and security." This permissive language allows the Council toignore the restraining clause in Article 2 (Section 7) that says that the UN cannot"intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of anystate." Once the Council decides that a state poses a threat to international peace,it has full freedom to intervene in that state. There is no opening for judicial orother review.However, this authority is limited by the important procedural mechanism ofthe veto. Each of the Great Powers has the power to block any intervention that itfeels goes against its interests. Article 27 gives each member of the Council onevote, but says that decisions on substantive matters require nine in favor "includingthe concurring votes of the permanent members." The veto was crucial for theGreat Powers at the San Francisco conference in 1945, where the Charter wasdrafted: without it, they made clear, there would be no UN at all. The Great Powerspresented this as protecting the less powerful states from future great-power wars;the British delegate at San Francisco suggested, apparently seriously, that the CouncilSeton HallJournalofDiplomacy and International RelationsOF WORDS AND WARS 71"represented one of the most remarkable advances in all human history."8 The realpayoff, though, is of course that the Great Powers can cut-off action against themselvesor their allies.The inaction implied by the veto guarantees that theCouncil will be paralyzed at precisely those moments of thegreatest tension between the Great Powers.The fact that the veto works negatively, in permitting the Great Powers to killresolutions with which they disagree, means that the Council is biased in the directionof inaction. But inaction, as the UN founders knew, can be very useful. Theinaction implied by the veto guarantees that the Council will be paralyzed at preciselythose moments of the greatest tension between the Great Powers. When one findsoneself standing in a minefield, sometimes the best way to avoid a catastrophicmisstep is to not step all. When the Great Powers disagree, the Council will not beable to act, and the drafters of the UN Charter believed that in such cases, it shouldnot act since to act would be to invite disaster for the whole organization. The vetois the convenient institutional mechanism by which the Council gets out of the waywhen the Great Powers clash. This is not a "flaw" in the design of the Council-thisis the sine qua non of the Council. Thus, far from putting forward "imaginary truthsthat transcend politics"9 as Glennon claims, this system is a sensitive politicalcompromise to manage the competing interests of the Great Powers and also tomaintain some opening for a useful international organization.The Council was intended to manage how the strong could dominate the weak-not for the benefit of the weak, but rather to avoid the strong stepping on eachother's toes. It does not prohibit the intervention of the Great Powers upon otherstates; in fact it encourages intervention as long as the Great Powers can all be broughtto agree on it. In cases where the Great Powers disagree, the members of theCouncil have never been so deluded as to believe that their job was to stop theunilateral action of a fellow member. Further, there was no expectation at SanFrancisco that the Council's contribution to world order was to regulate the foreignadventures of the Great Powers.Nothing has changed in the subsequent sixty years to alter these limits on theCouncil's authority. The system of Great-Power management established in 1945remains the central logic of the UN security system today. This is clear from themixed history of UN adventures in peacekeeping and peace building. When theGreat Powers agreed on interventions in the 1990s, the Council empowered the UNto intervene quite dramatically in places like Cambodia, East Timor, and LatinAmerica-but these same conflicts were allowed for years to fester while the GreatPowers quarreled their way through the cold war. While some would like to see theCouncil increase its influence over the Great Powers, the terms of the Charter makethis very difficult and amendment of it on this point is nigh inconceivable.Winter/Spring 200472 HURDPOWER AND LEGITIMACY AT THE COUNCILIn this more realistic assessment of the purposes of the Council, one finds amore modest set of goals and powers for the Council than some critics imagine.However, this does not mean one can dismiss the council as entirely inconsequential-the lowering of expectations does not mean abandoning them altogether. The Councildoes have some power over strong states, even over the United States, and thiscomes in the shape of the "audience effect."Many countries believe that the Council carries legitimacy in the area ofinternational peace and security. They alter their behavior based on the results ofCouncil deliberations. This belief in legitimacy may be the product of misguidedidealism about the nature of the Council of the type criticized by Perle andKrauthammer, or of a genuine commitment to the principles of multilateralism andconsensus, but its origin matters less than the fact that many governments take theCouncil seriously and adjust their foreign policies accordingly. Over Iraq, had themythic "second resolution" come to pass, it is not difficult to imagine middle-of-the-road countries falling in line behind it-including some, like Turkey, that could havemade a significant contribution to the war.Faith in the legitimacy of the Council is more prevalent in the less powerfulstates than in the Great Powers, and in general the normative component of the UNis carried more by the less powerful than by the hegemonic. It is the less powerfulstates that perceive Council decisions as conferring legitimacy on outcomes, and itis therefore these countries that press for the rule-of-law in international affairs. Buteven the more powerful states have good self-interested reasons for recognizing thepower that this legitimacy represents. These beliefs are extremely important, evenfor states that may not hold them, since they are a useful device in understanding(and manipulating) the behavior of the less powerful states.What matters in either case is that many governments takeseriously the Council and adjust their foreign policiesaccordingly.In such an environment, a wise American foreign policy must take this sentimentinto account, even if U.S. policymakers themselves do not share the belief in Councillegitimacy. The costs to the Great Powers of acting unilaterally are raised to theextent that other countries react negatively to the United States' bypassing of theCouncil. This effect is seen when the Great Powers seek Council approval to legitimizetheir actions. When the Council does not grant its approval, the option ofunilateralism certainly remains viable and is often taken. This is arguably whathappened in the U.S.-Iraq case, as well as in the NATO-Kosovo case. At suchmoments, the political costs to unilateralism are raised, but no realistic observer ofinternational politics should be surprised that Great Powers continue to intervene inworld affairs. Certainly the drafters of the Charter would not be surprised.Seton HallJournal ofDiplomacy and International RelationsOF WORDS AND WARS 73Understanding the power of the Council to legitimize policies is the key tounderstanding the great American need for the UN in U.S. foreign policy, especiallyas the United States embarks on a new age of imperialism.When the Council does not grant its approval, the option ofunilateralism certainly remains viable and is often taken.THE COUNCIL'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE U.S.-IRAQ COMPLEXThe conservative and liberal critics of the Council disagree on a lot, but theyagree on the basic contention that the Council demonstrated its irrelevance by itsfailure to act over Iraq. Inaction, both say, violated the fundamental Charter obligationof the Council to "maintain or restore international peace and security" and, giventhe high stakes of the crisis, showed that when most needed, it cannot be reliedupon. But to dismiss the Council for failing to be more active in the Iraq crisis is toimagine a straw-man version of the Council, pumped up on idealist and legaliststeroids. It misses the point of the real purposes of the Council. Admittedly, thereal objectives of the Council are more modest than the critics suggest and it mightbe a cause for complaint, but it is by these standards that the Council's contributionshould be judged. A more realistic assessment of the. Council's purpose reveals thatits contribution was not negligible, even if it was less than both what the conservativesare afraid of and what the progressives aspire to.On Iraq, the veto worked as intended-it provided an escape route, honorableor otherwise, for the Council in a situation where Great Powers were irreconcilablyat odds. Even within the constraints of this basic inaction, the Council managed tocontribute in three small ways to its general goals of maintaining international peaceand stability. Each of the three ways is small relative to the stakes of the crisis, buteach raises the political costs of unilateralism. Given the chasm that opened upbetween veto-holding states, this is the most that could be expected of the Council.First, the Council has sufficient legitimacy in international politics thatWashington found it advantageous to seek Council approval for the operation. Thisproduced the first round of diplomatic maneuvering and reopened the debate overhow to deal with Saddam Hussein in the fall of 2002. It also forced the UnitedStates to justify its position, particularly on weapons of mass destruction, and it nowfinds itself trying to live up to its public claims.Second, many third-party countries, such as Canada and Turkey, looked to theCouncil to signal whether it was appropriate to support the mission. When theCouncil failed to approve the military solution to the Iraq problem, these countries(and a wide swath of public opinion) chose to stay on the sidelines. Had the Councilacted differently, it is likely that many countries and publics would have acteddifferently also, and both the military and diplomatic challenges faced by the UnitedStates would have been lessened.Winter/Spring 200474 HURDThird, the Council, by refusing to approve the operation, accomplished both ofits (realistic but more modest) goals when Great Powers disagree: it reinforced thelegal principles of the Charter on the use of force, and it slightly raised the politicalcosts of unilaterali~m for the hegemon. This is the most that the Council can dorelative to a Great Power.On Iraq, the veto worked as intended-it provided anescape route, honorable or otherwise, for the Council in asituation -where Great Powers were irreconcilably at odds.It cannot be seriously claimed that the UN Security Council is a failure as aninstitution unless it effectively restrains the Great Powers from their militaryadventures, nor ihat Great Power disagreement in the Council chamber signals itsirrelevance. This position is untenable because it misunderstands the basic structureof the Council and the political compromise that brought it into being. When thestrong disagree on how to organize the system, then the Council, by virtue of theveto, wisely steps aside.THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICYSeeing the Council in this light is important because it affects how Americanforeign policymakers assess U.S. interests in world politics. The liberal critics ofthe Council are right that it has neither the legal nor the military capacity to blockAmerican unilateralism; yet, they are mistaken that it is therefore wise to ignore it.Blocking American action is beside the point. What matters is how the UN affectsthe political calculations of the United States pursuing its preferred policies, and inmost cases, it can affect the costs and benefits faced by American foreign policymakers.When the United States mobilize the legitimacy of the Council behind its interests,it becomes easier to win the support of third-parties, and the United States gainsleverage in deflecting criticism. This may in reality be an illusion, as the conservativecritics note, but as long as it is an illusion that works, then it is worth investing in.The value of legitimacy for American policies will rise, not fall, in the coming yearsif unipolar hegemony indeed emerges as the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy.Hegemony, as is known from past experience, is more efficient and less costly whensupported by both brute force and legitimacy.As for the future of the UN, this more realistic reading of the Council suggestsa great deal more continuity with the past than the critics are willing to admit.When the Great Powers agree, the Council can be empowered to work constructivelyto "restore international peace and security," as it did on occasion in the 1990s.When they disagree, the Council will certainly sit idle, as it did through the coldwar, sidelined by disagreements over the very questions that matter most. A periodof energetic American military hegemony will not necessarily result in theobsolescence of the Security Council, since there is no incentive for other permanentSeton Hall Journal ofDiplomacy and International RelationsOF WORDS AND WARS 75members to oppose the United States on every issue. Thus, there will be moments ofGreat Power consensus alongside moments of deadlock, and the Council will fromtime to time be found by the United States to be a useful venue. All in all, the futurelooks to be very similar to the past.NotesMichael J. Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, p. 16.2 Richard Perle, "Thank God for the Death of the UN," The Guardian, March 21, 2003.3 Charles Krauthammer, "UN RIP," Washington Post, Jan. 31, 20031 Glennon, "Why the Council Failed," p. 16.5 Glennon, "Why the Council Failed," p. 18.6 Krauthanmer, "UN RIP."7 Glennon, "Why the Council Failed," p. 16.1 United Nations, United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco, CA: 1945),v. 11, p. 435.9 Glennon, "Why the Council Failed," p. 32.Winter/Spring 2004

Of Words and Wars: The Security Council\u27s Hard Life Among the Great Powers

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Of Words and Wars: The Security Council\u27s Hard Life Among the Great Powers

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