Enticing the Supreme Court to Hold That Physical Contact is Not Required to Violate the Child Enticement Statute

Abstract

The sexual exploitation of children is a growing problem in the United States. Fifty years ago, parents feared their child getting kidnapped or approached by a predator in the park. Parents today fear their child being preyed upon through the internet. As technology continues to advance, child predators satisfy their depraved desires without ever stepping foot near their victim. In response to the danger of the sexual exploitation of children, the federal government enacted the child enticement statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The statute criminalizes the enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity. Because the federal code does not define “sexual activity” for purposes of § 2422(b), courts are left to decipher whether the predator must entice the minor to engage in physical contact. Three circuits have definitively spoken on this issue. The Seventh Circuit held that sexual activity requires physical contact. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have both held that physical contact is not required to implicate § 2422(b). This Comment demonstrates through methods of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and congressional intent that § 2422(b) does not require physical contact. This Comment proposes that the Supreme Court grant certiorari and hold that § 2422(b) does not require interpersonal physical contact