Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets

Abstract

We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) from one dimension to higher dimensions. In this model, Pareto efficiency is incompatible with individual rationality and strategy-proofness (Konishi et al., 2001). Therefore, we consider two weaker efficiency properties: coordinatewise efficiency and pairwise efficiency. We show that these two properties both (i) are compatible with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, and (ii) help us to identify two specific mechanisms. To be more precise, on various domains of preference profiles, together with other well-studied properties (individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness), coordinatewise efficiency and pairwise efficiency respectively characterize two extensions of the top-trading-cycles mechanism (TTC): the coordinatewise top-trading-cycles mechanism (cTTC) and the bundle top-trading-cycles mechanism (bTTC). Moreover, we propose several variations of our efficiency properties, and we find that each of them is either satisfied by cTTC or bTTC, or leads to an impossibility result (together with individual rationality and strategy-proofness). Therefore, our characterizations can be primarily interpreted as a compatibility test: any reasonable efficiency property that is not satisfied by cTTC or bTTC could be considered incompatible with individual rationality and strategy-proofness. For multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences, our characterization of bTTC constitutes the first characterization of an extension of the prominent TTC mechanis