This thesis comprises of two theoretical chapters addressing the hierarchical structure of environmental policy and the understanding of how this affects international environmental cooperation. The third chapter is an experimental analysis, offering a perspective on how heterogeneous stakeholders interact in the provision of a common public good, such as international cooperation on emission reductions. The common thread of the three chapters lies in the question of how the structure and decisionmaking process in international environmental policy facilitates or hinders the provision of public goods. The overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute to a more profound comprehension of potential obstacles and prospects of future international environmental cooperation by accounting for political economy frictions not previously or suffciently researched. Gaining a deeper understanding of the effects of domestic electoral competition combined with political polarisation and the associated incentives for governments in power, delegation mechanisms within domestic political systems as well as burden-sharing among heterogeneous stakeholders will prove necessary in order to provide instructive policy guidance for the design of more effective environmental policy in the future
