The purpose of this study is to explore practical alternatives for resolving monopoly holdouts, i.e., without requiring eminent domain. Berman v Parker (1954) first set formal precedent by allowing eminent domain to be used for taking strictly non-blighted property. Kelo v City of New London (2005) simply reaffirmed Berman, authorizing the use of eminent domain to overcome seven monopoly holdouts, including that of Ms. Susette Kelo, for a new Pfizer Corporation headquarters, on grounds that creating new jobs and tax revenues constituted “Public Benefits” under the Takings Clause. Heller (1998) argued that using direct government intervention in this manner simply transfers monopoly ownership rights between private individuals, i.e., while leaving scarce public resources persistently underutilized as “anticommons” property… a classic market failure. Following Coase’s landmark research on free riders, this study conducted formal IRB interviews with members of AUREO [Association of University Real Estate Officials] who willingly discussed their direct participation, i.e., during ongoing campus expansion projects at four respective public universities across the US. Chapters 3 and 4 fully document the firsthand narrative accounts provided by these real-world practitioners, who described the host of innovative bargaining mechanisms they routinely employed, i.e., enabling them to successfully resolve monopoly holdouts without requiring eminent domain. As a practical alternative to longstanding policy orthodoxy, this study finds that by systematically negotiating reciprocal, mutually beneficial [Coasean] bargaining agreements with recalcitrant landowners, it is possible to successfully resolve monopoly holdouts without requiring eminent domain. While these results may seem pedestrian to the layperson, their practical implications for the practice of Regional/City Planning are profound. By employing these same innovative bargaining mechanisms, it enables urban planners/designers/administrators to continually seek out local innovators (of all stripes), partner them with youthful entrepreneurs, and create new economic, social, and political synergies, i.e., enabling any local municipality to achieve the same urban growth/redevelopment/revitalization renaissance pioneered in so-called “College Towns”.
Keywords: Coase Theorem; Market Externalities: Holdout Problem; Anticommons; Pigouvian Taxation; Takings Clause: Eminent Domain Alternatives; Market Failure Theory; Samuelson Condition; Nash Equilibrium; Sustainability; Land Assembly
