University of Malta. Islands and Small States Institute
Abstract
The increasing number and complexity of hybrid threat activities forces small
states, especially those with limited access to material resources, to reassess their foreign and
defence policies. While the variable of ‘smallness’ may be sufficient to justify their overall
engagement in dealing with conventional security threats, in the hybrid arena this is not the
case. Pressure is amplified in establishing or maintaining a status of a reliable mediator, partner,
and strategic communicator vis-à-vis their multilateral relations with other states or
organisations to which they belong. This paper focuses on how small European states, with
specific reference to Cyprus, Malta, and Estonia, need to develop adjustable yet resilient
policies in accommodating security needs vis-à-vis hybrid threats, that are not only pertinent
to their security, but also to that of the EU bloc. As the line between war and peace becomes
more blurred due to hybrid threats, the small states’ security shortcomings may also become a
security problem for the EU bloc. We argue that the nature of hybrid threats is such that hybrid
activities can be utilised to hurt bigger states in a bloc by exploiting the small states’
vulnerabilities. Both the defensive and foreign policy collaborations of small states with bigger
states have been, and are constantly being, re-evaluated to tackle and prevent such problems.
As such, two objectives are identified in this approach. The first is the small states’ quest to
appear as reliable partners within the bloc. The second is to avoid being the weakest security
link in the bloc’s defence against hybrid threats. This unfamiliar environment for small states
prompts us to rethink security from their perspective against complex and hybrid threats, and
in relation to their security role as members of large organisations such as the EU.peer-reviewe